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Introduction
The subject of federal diversity jurisdiction, with the problems
inherent therein, has been the object of research among legal scholars,
constitutional fabricators and jurisprudential analysts since the inception of our Constitution.' The subject of this Article is a very narrow
segment of the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Article
is limited to those controversies to which a representative has become
a party after the primary activity of other persons has caused the
controversy to arise. It will deal with executors, administrators,
t A.B., 1951, Amherst College; LLB., 1954, Harvard University; Member, Philadelphia Bar.
t A.B., 1952, Amherst College; LLB., 1955, Harvard University; Member, Philadelphia Bar.
1. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 86-102,
136-41 (1928) ; Charles E. Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 19 A.B.A.J. 499 (1933) ; Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in
Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19 A.B.A.J. 71, 149, 265 (1933);
Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of Different
States Be Preservedf, 18 A.B.A.J. 499 (1932) ; Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and
Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433, 437-439 (1932) ; Morse, Judicial SelfDenial and Judicial Activism-The Personality of the Original Jurisdiction of The
Federal District Courts, 3 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 101, 126 (1954) ; Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 499, 520-530 (1928) ; McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: 1.1, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 1225 (1943); Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REV.
356 (1933) ; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234 (1948) ; Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
-Comments by Members of Chicago University Law Faculty, 31 MICH. L. REV. 59
(1932) ; Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-In Reply to Professor
Yntema, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1931) ; Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis
of Concurrent Jurisdiction,79 U. PA. L. REV. 869 (1931) ; Keeffe, Twenty Nine Distinct Dainnations of the Federal Practice-and a National Ministry of Justice, 7
VAND. L. REV. 636, 655 (1954).
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trustees of an express trust, receivers, guardians, assignees, subrogees,
injured parties under direct action statutes, corporations, class actions
and unincorporated associations. In order to explore this subject effectively, general principles of diversity jurisdiction and the specific
problems of collusion, the real party in interest, capacity to sue and
be sued, citizenship and other related subjects shall be examined. The
effect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this area will also be
considered. Finally, the Article will consider some observations and
recommendations on the general issue of federal diversity jurisdiction.
I
A General View of the Subject
In 1833, Joseph Story wrote of the Constitution's diversity clause
as follows:
. .
Although the necessity of this power may not stand upon
grounds quite as strong, as some of the preceding, there are high
motives of state policy and public justice, by which it can be
clearly vindicated. There are many cases, in which such a power
may be indispensable, or in the highest degree expedient, to carry
into effect some of the privileges and immunities conferred, and
some of the prohibitions upon states expressly declared, in the
constitution..
"Nothing can conduce more to general harmony and confidence among all the states, than a consciousness, that controversies
are not exclusively to be decided by the state tribunals; but may, at
the election of the party, be brought before the national tribunals.
A corporation, as such, is not a citizen of a state in
the sense of the constitution. But . . . a citizen of a state is
entitled to sue, as such, notwithstanding he is a trustee for others,
or sues in autre droit, as it is technically called, that is, as representative of another.
,,2
In 1954, of the same clause Felix Frankfurter wrote:
"The stuff of diversity jurisdiction is state litigation.
"A legal device like that of federal diversity jurisdiction
which is inherently, as I believe it to be, not founded in reason,
offers constant temptation to new abuses..
. ..Is it sound public policy to withdraw from the incentives
and energies for reforming state tribunals, where such reform is
needed, the interests of influential groups who through diversity
litigation are now enabled to avoid state courts?" a
2. STORY, COMMENTARIES 628-29, 632 (1833).

3. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 53, 54-55, 60 (1954)

(con-

curring opinion).
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The evidence we have as to the early history of diversity jurisdiction leaves us somewhat lacking in conclusive answers as to the purposes
underlying the constitutional and legislative provisions.' The traditional
reason, that it was necessary to have protection from local prejudice
against nonresidents, was classically stated by Chief Justice Marshall:
"However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the
states will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation,
to parties of every description, it is not less true that the Constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or
views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions
of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision
of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens
of different states." 5
Mr. Justice Story reiterated this reason perhaps more pointedly:
"The Constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly
we do not inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices, state
jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice. . . . No other reason than that which has
been stated can be assigned, why some, at least, of these cases
should not have been left to the cognizance of the state courts." 6
There was not much discussion of diversity jurisdiction prior to
the conventions for ratification of the Constitution, and the traditional
reason has been severely questioned. 7 There seems to be some evidence
of a fear of state legislators as a danger to out-of-state creditors; of
a lack of confidence in elective judges; of a fear of legislative review
in some states; and a desire to create strong businessmen's courts."
Madison felt that this was just a temporary provision which would
allow federal courts to handle these controversies until "they find the
tribunals of the states established on a good footing." '
The constitutional provision that "The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies . . . between Citizens of different
4. Yntema, The Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States, 19 A.B.A.J. 71 (1933) ; Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. Rtv. 483 (1928).
5. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).

6. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816).

7. See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. Rrv.

483 (1928).

8. Id. at 495-498. See also Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTZMP. PROB. 3, 22-28 (1948).
9. 3 ELLIOT, DEBAT9S 536 (2d ed. 1941). Washington himself stated in his second
annual address to Congress in 1790: "The laws you have already passed for the establishment of a Judiciary System have opened the doors of Justice to all descriptions of
persons. You will consider in your wisdom, whether improvements in that system may
yet be made; . . ." 31 WRITINGS or GEORGE WASHINGTON 167 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1939).
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States" "0did not establish courts vested with this jurisdiction. It
provided limits or boundaries within which Congress could establish
courts with such jurisdiction." Congress responded with the Judiciary
Act of 1789, vesting the circuit courts with original jurisdiction concurrent with the states, of suits "between a citizen of the State where
the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." 12
The nation was not very concerned about federal jurisdiction until
the Constitution was nearly a century old. Until that time the federal
courts were not overloaded and Supreme Court Justices had time to sit
frequently on circuit. With transportation more difficult, controversies did not cross state lines as frequently; they were more often local
in character and therefore solely within the jurisdiction of the state
courts.
Significantly, there was no change in the diversity jurisdiction
until 1875, when the provision was broadened to include any suit
"in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different
States.

.

.

."

" Until this time there had been little strain on the

diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. In the same 1875 Act,
however, there were included various restrictions on the federal jurisdiction, including the anti-collusion provision which found wide use
for the next thirty-five years.' 4
In 1887 Congress raised the jurisdictional amount to $2,000 15
but made no other changes in the diversity provisions although the
Judicial Code experienced a major revision. Again in 1911 the
jurisdictional amount was raised to $3,000 16 Until 1948 there were
no changes made in the jurisdictional provisions, with the exception
of the 1940 extension of the diversity clause to include citizens of the
District of Columbia. 1 7 In 1948, during another major revision of
the Judicial Code, no change was made in the basic grant of diversity
jurisdiction, but the anti-collusion and anti-assignment clauses were
combined into a more general provision.
The present statute provides:
"(a)

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum

10. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

11. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) ; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 441
12. Act of
13. Act of
14. Act of

(1850) ; Turner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 11, 1 STAT. 73, 78.
March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 1, 18 STAT. 470.
March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 5, 18 STAT. 470, 472.

15. Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, § 1, 24 STAT. 552.
16. Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 24, 36 STAT.
17. Act of Apr. 20, 1940, c. 117, 54 STAT. 143.
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or value of $3,000 exclusive of interests and costs, and is
between:
(1) Citizens of different States: . . ."18
Congress has adopted the exact language of the Constitution with
respect to diversity jurisdiction. It has not attempted to define this
language; this has been left to the courts. Accordingly, the courts,
where they define the jurisdiction, are primarily construing the statute.
The question of the citizenship of a representative party as the
basis for federal jurisdiction first arose in the Supreme Court in 1808
in Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux.'9 By that time the Supreme Court
had already ruled that diversity of citizenship must exist between all
plaintiffs and all defendants.2" Thus, in Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux,
a finding that either the executor or his testator were of diverse
citizenship from the defendant would not have sufficed. The facts of
the case were that the plaintiffs, both citizens of France, were executors
of the estate of a Georgia decedent. They sued on a debt due their
testator from another Georgia testator for whom the defendant, also
a Georgian, was executor. Thus, if the parties had to stand on the
citizenship of their testators, jurisdiction would have failed, since the
original debt would have produced a purely local controversy had
the testators lived until settlement of the debt. An impatient Chief
Justice Marshall interrupted counsel at the very beginning of his argument on the jurisdictional question, with the remark that "The
present impression of the court is, that the case is clearly within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The plaintiffs are aliens,
and although they sue as trustees, yet they are entitled to sue in the
circuit court." 21
Thus, the Supreme Court predicated the diversity jurisdiction of
the federal courts on the now well-established procedural rule that
the parties need only be the proper parties to the action at the time
the jurisdiction of the court attaches. 2
18. 62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
19. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808).
20. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).

Thus, if any one
plaintiff and any one defendant had identical citizenship, diversity was destroyed.
21. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306, 308 (1808). It is interesting to speculate whether Marshall's position would have been so abruptly unquestionable to him had it been a controversy between citizens of different states, rather than one where "an alien is a
party" under 1 STAT. 73, 78 (1789). It seems doubtful that it would have been.
22. That this test is procedural is evident from the jurisdictional significance of
the real party in interest provision, FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1311-1329 (2d ed. 1948) ;1 CvCLOPeIA oI FEDERAL PROCEDURE 448-457 (3d
ed. 1951) ; 2 BARRON & HoLTZOrp, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5-23 (Rules ed.
1950). See also, 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES 348, 349 (2d ed. 1832) ; the rule there stated
was repeated verbatim in 1 KENT, COMMENTARiES 349 (13th ed. 1884).
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II

General Principles
There are several principles of law which have permeated the
courts' interpretation of federal diversity jurisdiction based on representation. A brief discussion of these principles at this point will
aid in a better understanding of the later development of specific diversity problems.
Real Party In Interest-At common law an action could be

instituted only in the legal titleholder's name. Those having equitable
interests could not bring suit on their own account." Later development allowed one having the beneficial interest to start suit for his
own benefit in the legal owner's name, with the beneficial owner as
the real party in interest.2 4 In the foregoing situation one having
the beneficial or equitable interest could sue in his own name in equity.
As law and equity became one, suits were permitted in the name of
the real party in interest.25
The real party in interest is that person whom the law recognizes
to have the right to come into court and seek relief.2 6
Certain courts, when dealing with the real party in interest concept, have used Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
develop this principle. The federal courts have long had a procedural
rule that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest. Formerly this was Equity Rule 37,2 7 and it is presently
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It states:
"Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest: but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining with
him the party for whose benefit the action is brought;

,"

28

23. Edmunds v. Illinois Central Ry., 80 Fed. 78 (C.C.N.D. La. 1897); ThomasBonner Co. v. Hoover, Owens & Rintachler Co., 284 Fed. 377, 383 (S.D. Ohio, 1920),
aff'd, 284 Fed. 386 (6th Cir. 1922) ; Clark and Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest,

34

YALE

L. J. 258, 261, 262, 276'(1-925).

24. Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379 (1888)
Delaware County Comm'rs v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U.S. 33 (1890) ; Taylor
Co. v. Anderson, 275 U.S. 431 (1928).
25. See Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 1291,
1310-1312 (1935).
26. See Simes, The Real Party in Interest, 10 Ky. L.J. 60, 61 (1922) ; Clark and
Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L.J. 258 (1925) ; 3 Mooar, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1305 (2d ed. 1948).
27. Lloyd Moore Inc. v. Swartz, 26 F. Supp. 188 (E.D. Pa. 1938).

28. Fim R. Civ. P. 17(a).
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The language of the rule is not absolutely clear.29 It has been
commented that the "but" clause does not delineate an exception to
the real party in interest rule; rather that the enumerated parties are
to be included as real parties in interest within the meaning of the
rule and their listing is made so as to insure this right.3"
This provision is designed to be a procedural rule, but the courts
have afforded it, as the cases later considered will show, a jurisdictional status. Congress did not expressly give it a jurisdictional
status, since no substantive changes were intended by the codification
according to the enabling statute. 3 ' Nor could the rule make any
change in the pre-existing requirements for jurisdiction in the federal
courts, for Rule 82 itself provides:
"These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the United States courts or the venue of actions
therein". 2
Consequently, Rule 17(a) applies to the entitling of an action once
federal jurisdiction attaches.
Collusion-For various reasons, litigants have found it desirable
This has
to take their suits into federal rather than state courts.'
often led attorneys to prepare their cases with an eye to the creation
of a diversity of citizenship. Occasionally these schemes have been
scrutinized in the light of a congressional instruction which provides
that :
"A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction
of such court." "
29. Professor Moore has stated that: "Its meaning perhaps would be more accurately
expressed if it read: An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by
the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. The reason for its retention,
no doubt, was due to the feeling that judicial construction by the federal equity courts
and the courts of the states that have such provisions had reduced its ambiguities to a
minimum, and that an experiment with other language might only cause new difficulties." Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Problems Raised by the Preliminary
Draft, 25 GEo. L. J. 551, 564-65 (1937).
30. 3 MooR", FEDERAL PRACTICE 1365 (2d ed. 1948).
31. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C. § 2072(2) (1952): "Such rules shall neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
33. See Kaufmann Estate, 87 Pa. D & C 401 (O.C., Phila. 1954) ; Johnson, Minor,
3 Fid. Rep. 337 (1953). In the latter case, Van Roden, P.J. (O.C. Del. County) refused to remove a non-resident guardian who had been appointed solely to create
diversity.
34. 62 STAT.935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952).
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This statute has a long and troubled history. In the first Judiciary
Act of 1789 Congress prohibited jurisdiction of the circuit court
"unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents [of any chose in action] if no assignment
had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange." "
This was a wooden rule. It militated against many bona fide transfers
and kept controversies out of the federal courts which might just as
well have been there. It more than served to curb the fear of collusive assignment. On the other hand, it excepted two important types
of choses in action from its coverage: foreign bills of exchange and
Nothing prevented the use of assignments
corporate bearer paper."
of these choses in action to create the necessary diversity of citizenship.
To overcome the restrictions of the clause, the courts found it advisable to limit the term "chose in action" by excluding from its
scope (1) an implied in law duty or promise, 37 and (2) a transfer of
a property interest.88
In 1875 Congress passed a statute designed to cut down on the
manufacture of federal jurisdiction. It authorized dismissal of any
suit which
"does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy
properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the
parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or
joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creat.
3
ing a case cognizable or removable under this act
"

This act survived in substance until in 1948 it was combined with the
earlier anti-assignment provision to form the present section 1359,°
which was thought to eliminate much "legislative jargon" 41 and take
a more direct approach.
35. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 11, 1 STAT. 73, 78, 79. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49
In 1875 the statute was amended further to exclude
U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
"promissory notes negotiable by the law merchant," 18 STAT. 470. It was re-enacted in
substantially the same form in 1888, 25 STAT. 433, and in 1911, 36 STAT. 1091.
36. See Bonnafee v. Williams, U.S. (3 How.) 574 (1845).
37. See Irvine v. Bankard, 181 Fed. 206 (C.C.D. Md. 1910) aff'd per curiam, 184
Fed. 986 (4th Cir. 1911).
38. Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U.S. 589 (1915). See also, generally, HALL, COLLUSIVE
SUITS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 54-70 (unpublished thesis in Harvard Law School
Library 1931) ; CHAFETZ & GLOVER, THE BOUNDARY LINES OF THE FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 15-19 (unpublished thesis in Harvard Law School Library 1930).
39. Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 5, 18 STAT. 470, 472. See Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138 (1885) (corporate bearer paper collusively assigned).
40. 62 STAT.935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952).
41. See Comment, Chaos of Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts, 35 ILL. L.
Rev. 566, 569 (1941).
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Though a variety of collusive arrangements to create diversity
have failed,4 2 the statute has not proved sufficient, especially in recent
years.'
The purpose of denying a hearing to collusive suits was to
prevent the dockets of the federal courts from being overcrowded with
suits which were not within the purview of the Constitution or Congress.44
Much of the difficulty with this statute has arisen because the
courts are loathe to give weight to the motive or purpose behind the
appointment of any particular representative.45 If the representative
holds a valid legal appointment according to the applicable law, then
the federal court will usually accept that appointment as valid for
federal jurisdictional purposes as well as for the substantive purposes. 4'
42. Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R. 1951), Martineau v. City of St.
Paul, 78 F. Supp. 892 (D. Minn. 1948), aff'd, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949) ; French
v. Jeffries, 149 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 755 (1945) ; Cerri v.
Akron-People's Telephone Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914) ; Southern Realty Co.
v. Walker, 211 U.S. 603 (1909) ; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315 (1889) ; Farmington
v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138 (1885) ; Little v. Giles, 118 U.S. 596 (1886); Wilson v.
Knox County, 43 Fed. 481 (C.C. Mo. 1890) ; Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332
(1810) ; Lipschitz v. Napa Fruit Co., 223 Fed. 698 (2d Cir. 1915) ; Northern Ins. Co.
v. St. Louis & Ry., 15 Fed. 840 (C.C. Mo. 1883); Newgass v. New Orleans, 33
Fed. 196 (C.C. Mo. 1888). Western Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 95 F.
Supp. 993 (D. Mo. 1951).
43. 62 STAT. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952). Our research has been able to
discover only seventeen opinions which have construed section 1359 during the past
eight years. In three cases jurisdiction was denied on other grounds. Moynihan v.
Elliott, 195 ,F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Young v. Powell, 179 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1950) ;
Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Cal. 1953). In eleven opinions jurisdiction
was upheld and section 1359 was held not applicable. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d
Cir. 1955) ; McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Birmingham Post v.
Brown, 217 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 180 F.2d
1010 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Lisenby v. Patz, 130 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ; Fallat v. Gouran, 122 F. Supp. 610
(E.D. Pa. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955) ; Petrikin v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 15 F.R.D. 346 (W.D. Mo. 1954) ; Liberty Mutual v. Tel-Mor, 92 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Odlevak v. Elliott, 82 F. Supp.
607 (D. Del. 1949) ; Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 80 F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Pa.
1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950). Three opinions, all quite weak, based their
ouster of jurisdiction on section 1359. Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R.
1951) ; Birkens v. Seaboard Service, 96 F. Supp. 245 (D. N.J. 1950); Martineau v.
City of St. Paul, 78 F. Supp. 892 (D. Minn. 1948), aff'd on other grounds, 172 F.2d
777 (8th Cir. 1949).
44. Lehigh Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895).
45. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931): After the Louisiana widow had sued the Oklahoma defendant and had taken a voluntary non-suit three
times, she had an Oklahoma citizen appointed administrator in her stead to sue on behalf of the estate of the Louisiana decedent. Defendant's motion to remove was denied.
The anti-collusion statute, it was said, did not apply, since it only referred to collusive
creation of federal jurisdiction, whereas here jurisdiction was sought to be avoided or
defeated.
46. Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 180 F.2d 1010 (3rd Cir. 1950) ; Greene
v. Goodyear, 112 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Pa. 1953) ; Hopkins v. Pennsylvania Power and
Light Co., 112 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ; Burns v. Adam, 114 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.
Pa. 1953) ; Krivan v. Hourican, 117 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Pa. 1954) ; Gould v. Suburban Gas & Electric Light Co. 243 Fed. 930 (D. Mass. 1917) ; Stewart v. Patton, 32 F.
Supp. 675 (W.D. Tenn. 1940); Sisk v. Pressley, 81 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.S.C. 1948);
Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 27 F. Supp.
485) (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ; Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1945).
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Some state court judges, howetver, are hesitant to accept this responsibility to determine federal jurisdiction when they make an appointment.47
Alignment of parties- The federal courts are not bound by the
parties' own alignment of plaintiffs and defendants but may rearrange
them into their true positions, considering the genuine nature of the
interests presented.4 Although diversity is thus occasionally destroyed,
the courts often preserve diversity by this action and are loathe to
realign a corporation where so doing would possibly destroy the neces49
sary diversity.
Citizenship- One of the necessary prerequisites to diversity jurisdiction is that all the litigants have the necessary citizenship, as
opposed to mere residence or other status not rising to the equivalent
of citizenship. Others more learned have expounded this jurisprudential labyrinth, so here only attention will be drawn to this factor.5
Briefly, citizenship is dependent upon domicile, 5' a semi-permanent
inhabitation and a mental attitude or intention to remain indefinitely,5"
47. See Kaufmann Estate, 87 Pa. D & C 401 (O.C., Phila. 1954). The Orphans'
Court of Philadelphia was asked to appoint a foreign guardian for a local minor who
had been injured in a local automobile collision with a local citizen. Citing its general
policy not to appoint foreign guardians, the court first refused to appoint an active
New York businessman as guardian. But upon petition to appoint a Philadelphia lawyer who was a citizen of New Jersey, the court acquiesced. It found that, because
damage verdicts are higher and pleading and evidence rules are more liberal in the
federal courts, it was more in the interests of the minor to appoint a foreign guardian.
48. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank of New York, 314 U.S. 63 (1941), rehearing
denied, 314 U.S. 714 (1941) ; Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908 (7th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 819 (1954) - Foster v. Carlin, 200 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1952);
Grant County Deposit Bank v. Mcdampbell, 194 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Soderstrom
v. Kungsholm Baking Co., 189 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951); Hallmark Productions v.
Mosley, 190 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Thomason Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
183 F.2d 729 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Peters v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 174 F.2d 162 (5th
Cir. 1949); Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 181 (1825); Wormley v. Wormley,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 421 (1823); Wood v. Davis, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 467 (1855).
49. In shareholders' derivative suits the parties are aligned as their interests appear. If the corporation is dominated by persons hostile to the plaintiff's action the
corporation will not be aligned with the plaintiff so as to defeat diversity. Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) ; Opici v. Cucamonga Winery, 73 F.
Supp. 603 (D. Cal. 1947); Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658
(E.D. Ky. 1939), aff'd, 129 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942) ;
Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 321 (1905) ; Tucker v. National Linen Service Corp.,
92 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 828 (1951); Motor Terminals v. National Car Co., 92 F. Supp. 155 (D. Del.
1949). But cf. Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 781 (S.D. Cal. 1953), and comments
thereon in 54 COLUM. L. Rev. 629 (1955), 68 HARv. L. Rev. 193 (1954), 40 VA. L.
Rev. 492 (1955).
50. The "citizenship" basis of diversity is founded on citizenship "of different
states" or "of a state". See 62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
51. Baker v. Keck, 13 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. I1. 1936) ; Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200
Fed. 165 (W.D. Mo. 1912). See 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 254 (1950); Reese & Green,
That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. Rev. 561 (1953).
52. Brown v. Keane, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 112 (1834) ; Pannill v. Roanoke Times Co.,
252 Fed. 910 (W.D. Va. 1918); Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed. 165 (W.D. Mo. 1912);
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as manifestly demonstrated by the party." It is the citizenship of the
parties at the inception of the suit that controls for diversity purposes, 4
and jurisdiction cannot fail once it attaches.55
Capacity- Capacity is a personal right to come into court and be
heard.5" In the representation case, the question becomes whether
the representative has received proper legal authentication as such,
either by an appointing court with proper jurisdiction or by valid legal
transfer between parties. 7 Capacity in the federal courts is defined by
Rule 17(b).5' Strictly speaking, capacity is a term without jurisdictional connotations in the federal courts. However, some courts have
heavily stressed the jurisdictional effect of capacity.59
Controversy - According to the Constitution, as well as the jurisdictional statute, there must exist a "Controversy" between the parties on whom jurisdiction is to depend. A controversy exists whenever a substantive right exists in favor of or against the party in
question.
"To sustain diversity jurisdiction there must exist an 'actual,' Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U. S. 32, 36, 'substantial,' NilesBement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 254 U. S. 77, 81,
controversy between citizens of different states .

.

. It is our

duty to 'look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties acPoppenhauser v. India-Rubber Comb Co., 14 Fed. 707 (S.D. N.Y. 1883); Valentine
v. Powers, 85 F. Supp. 732 (D. Neb. 1948) ; Garberson v. Garberson, 82 F. Supp. 706
(N.D. Iowa 1949) ; Blaine v. Murphy, 265 Fed. 324 (D. Mass. 1920) ; Linton v. Cantrell, 34 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
53. Shoaf v. Fitzpatrick, 104 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 620
(1939); Maynard v. Finney, 92 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 648
(1937); Davis v. Dixon, 184 Fed. 509 (S.D. W. Va. 1910) ; Dossett v. Davis, 29 F.
Supp. 483 (E.D. Tenn. 1939); Leave v. Boston Elevated Ry., 14 F. Supp. 775 (D.
Mass. 1936) ; Tudor v. Leslie, 35 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1940) ; Welsh v. American
Surety Co. of New York, 186 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Maple Island Farm, Inc. v.
Bitterling, 196 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 832 (1952) ; Jennings
v.. Fanti, 96 F. Supp. 264 (M.D. Pa. 1951) ; Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.
1954).
54. Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1952);
Lyons v. Weltmer, 174 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 850 (1949).
55. Mollance v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824).
56. United States v. Association of Am. Railroads, 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb. 1945).
57. Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
58. FrD. R. Civ. P. 17(b) : "The capacity of an individual, other than one acting
in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his
domicile. The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be -determined by
the law under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the laws of the state in which the district court is held, except
(1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity
by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of
enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws
of the United States, and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the
United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States is governed by Title
28, U.S.C., secs. 754 and 959(a)".
59. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955), discussed infra.
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cording to their sides in the dispute.' Dawson v. Columbia Trust
Co., 197 U. S. 178, 180. Litigation is the pursuit of practical
ends, not a game of chess. Whether the necessary 'collision of
interests,' Dawson v. Columbia Trust Co., supra, at 181, exists,
is therefore not to be determined by mechanical rules. It must
be ascertained from the 'principle purpose of the suit,' East Tennessee, V. X- G. R. v. Grayson, 119 U. S. 240, 244, and the
'primary and controlling matter in dispute,' Merchants' Cotton
Press Co. v. Insurance Co., 151 U. S. 368, 385." o
Jurisdiction vs. Venue-Proper venue should not be confused
with validity of jurisdiction when considering the diversity clause."'
Venue relates to the place where the court sits and dispenses justice;
jurisdiction applies to the power of the court to hear either the issue
or the parties.6 2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not affect
the venue issue,' but a federal court may not consider venue until
it determines that it has jurisdiction over the controversy. 4 The
question of venue is beyond the scope of this article.
Removal - Removal of a cause of action from a state court under
the applicable provisions of the Judicial Code,65 is subject to exactly
the same limitations and restrictions as an action commenced in the
federal courts.6 6 The diversity issue is not affected because the case
is a removed one.
III
Application to Specific Areas
Executors and Administrators
It is almost universally held that where an executor or administrator of an estate of a deceased person is a party to an action
in the federal courts, it is his personal citizenship which will govern
60. Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1941), rehearing
denied, 314 U.S. 714 (1941).
61. Cross v. Oneida Paper Products Co., 117 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1954) ; Dental
Precision Shoulder v. Caulk Co., 7 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1947). For an elaboration
of this point see Barrett, Venne and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608 (1954).
62. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
63. Doyle v. Loring, 107 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940).
64. Riley v. Union Pac. R.R., 117 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
911 (1950) ; Kibler v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1945); Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
65. 62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1952).
66. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (a). Cf. Lopata v. Handler 121 F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1941),
an unusual situation re removal. For a general view of the subject see BOULWARE, A
GUIDE TO REMOVAL AND ITS PREVENTION
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in determining the diversity jurisdiction.6 7 The courts have arrived
at this determination by adopting the real party in interest test.6 8
Thus, since the early case of Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux 69 the
Supreme Court has recognized that the citizenship of the decedent
is to be disregarded.7" Upon the death of the decedent the cause of
action becomes vested solely in the personal representative; he alone
may determine whether to bring or defend an action, and what course
to pursue in the protection of the decedent's property. Furthermore
he is liable to the estate and the beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary
duty.7 1
Likewise, persons interested in the estate of the decedent as
beneficiaries,7 2 creditors," survivors, 74 legatees 15 or distributees 76 generally have no importance in determining the diversity of citizenship
requirement.77
It is the person with the legal interest, not those
equitably interested, to whose citizenship the court looks. 78
These results are indisputable if we accept the real party in interest test for federal jurisdiction. The executor or administrator
must be the real party in interest in order that the estate may be
administered as a unity. The real party in interest provision applies
principally to determine by or against whom actions may be brought.79
A person who is dead may not bring an action or be sued, so the
67. For a general collation of cases see Annot., 77 A.L.R. 910 (1932) and Annot.,
BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 15, 19-20 (Rules ed. 1950) ; BENDER, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL 161 (1952) ;
1 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 471 (2d ed. 1945); HART & WECHSLER, THE

136 A.L.R. 938 (1942). See also 2

917 (1953) ; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1313-1314, 1365-1370 (2d ed. 1948).
68. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931) ; Childress v. Emory,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642 (1823) ; McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954)
Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph A. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 199 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1952)
Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950).
69. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808).
70. Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 66 (1871). But see Curran v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co., 123 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
71. See Miller v. Sunde, 1 N.D. 1, 3, 44 N.W. 301, 302 (1890). The duty, apparently, "is limited to faithful, honest administration and the payment of claims
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

legally allowed against the estate with proceeds from assets of the estate" and it ceases
when the estate is closed. Young v. Moore, 127 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1954).

72. Minnehaha County v. Kelley, 150 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1945).
73. Cf. Irvine v. Bankard, 181 Fed. 206 (C.C.D. Md. 1910), aff'd without opinion,

184 Fed. 986 (4th Cir. 1911).
74. McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954).
75. Young v. Powell, 179 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 948 (1950).
76. Geyer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 N.H. 224, 9 Am. Rep. 185

(1871). But see Thames v. Mississippi, 117 F.2d 949 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.

630 (1941); Schneider v. Eldredge, 125 Fed. 638 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1903); Mississippi
Power Co. v. Archibald, 189 Miss. 332, 196 So. 760 (1940).
77. American Bible Society v. Price, 110 U.S. 61 (1884).
78. McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). See notes 29 and 31, supra.
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decedent is clearly ruled out as the real party in interest. The other
classes of interested people, such as creditors or distributees, are
usually represented by more than one person with not necessarily
similar interests. To make them the real parties in interest would
lead to difficult and often insurmountable problems of service and
jurisdiction, as well as general inefficiency of administration. The
sole representative, in the person of the executor or administrator,
must be the real party in interest.8 0
The diversity of citizenship must have existed at the time action
was instituted."' The controversy will have arisen before or at the
time of the decedent's death. Should federal jurisdiction thus depend
on the fortuitous circumstance that one party to the controversy happened to die before the controversy reached the litigation stage?
Let us take a recent case in point. In Jaffe v. Philadelphia c
Western R. R.," decedent was killed by defendant's high-speed trolley car. Decedent and defendant were both citizens of Pennsylvania,
as was decedent's widow, to whom rceovery would inure under the
wrongful death statute. A stenographer in the office of the widow's
attorneys, chosen primarily because she was a citizen of New Jersey,
was appointed administratrix. The court of appeals upheld federal
jurisdiction, attacked under the anti-collusion statute 8" as well as the
real party in interest provision.
The Jaffe case might be rationalized on the theory that the
defendant won anyway, since the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's finding that defendant was not negligent; thus the jurisdictional question was not as clearly presented as it would have been
if the court had given judgment to the plaintiff. But such analysis
is not valid. It is the court's duty at all times to assure itself that
jurisdiction exists, and no court can proceed when it does not in fact
possess jurisdiction. 4 The jurisdictional question seems to have been
thoroughly considered by the court which appears to have had this
principle well in mind.
80. Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642, 669 (1823).
81. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379, 381382 (1884): "[T]he difference of citizenship on which the right of removal depends
must have existed at the time when the suit was begun, as well as at the time of the
removal." And jurisdiction, having once attached, will not be defeated by a party's
later change of domicile, Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824), nor
by the death of a party and the substitution of a non-diverse representative, Dunn v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 1, 2 (1834). This rule may also hold true for voluntary substitutions such as the appointment of a trustee or receiver. Cf. Hardenbergh v. Ray,
151 U.S. 112 118 (1894)
82. 180 )7.2d 1010 (3d. Cir. 1950). Followed in Krivan v. Hourican, 117 F. Supo.
908 (W.D. Pa. 1954) ; Hopkins v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 112 F. Supp. 136
(E.D. Pa. 1953).
83. Act of March 3, 1911, c.Z31, § 37, 36 STAT. 1098.

84. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
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Does the Jaffe case present a controversy between citizens of different states? If the decedent had been fortunate enough to have
lived, his action for injuries against the same defendant would have been
limited to the state courts. The injury was to a co-citizen, and it is
the liability for injury which is being litigated, whether the plaintiff
is the injured party still living or his personal representative after
death. Does not the controversy attach to the two parties involved
in the primary action, i.e., the trolley car striking the decedent, rather
than attach several hours later when he dies or several weeks later
when some largely disinterested person is appointed his personal representative ?
Another recent case is McCoy v. Blakelv,85 in which a non-resident
administrator was appointed for the sole purpose of creating jurisdiction after the decedent's "non-diverse" father had served as administrator for ten months. This fact was said not to violate section 1359
as a mattter of law, and the court relied on the district court's specific
finding that collusion did not exist.
It is difficult to imagine more appropriate cases in which to apply the anti-collusion statute s than the Jaffe and McCoy cases. The
courts, however, were worried by having to consider motive in order to
find collusion. 7 They felt that if the administrator was validly appointed by the proper probate court, then the court is bound by that
appointment and cannot go behind it to determine the reasons the
widow wished this particular appointment. Motive itself is not a legal
consideration. But where collusion is in, issue, then the question is one
of fraud on the court and on the other parties, thus requiring a look
to see whether the party charged with collusion had an intent to
deprive others of their legal rights. This concept has been applied
frequently in cases were a litigant has changed citizenship in order
to get into the federal courts."8 However, it has been applied only
85. 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954). In addition, the decedents non-diverse parents
were held not to be real parties in interest so as to defeat jurisdiction.
86. The present provision, which the Jaffe court said represented no substantial
change, reads: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or
joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 62 STAT. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1359
(1952).
87. The Court relied principally on Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S.
183 (1931), supra, note 45. See also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1319-1324 (2d 1948).
1 CYCLOPEDIA ov FzngADL PROCEDURE 485-491 (3d ed. 1951).
88. Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895); Morris v. Gilmer,
129 U.S. 315 (1889) ; Dossett v. Davis, 29 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Tenn. 1939). But see
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928) ; Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1913). See also, FISHMAN, SOME PROBLEMS O DIvrRsITY JURISDICTION 4-15 (unpublished thesis in Harvard
Law School Library 1929).
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very sparingly to the appointment of representatives.8 9 Of course,
there may be other purposes than solely the creation of federal jurisdiction for the appointment of a foreign representative. For those
other purposes the appointment could be perfectly valid. To say that
it is not valid to create federal jurisdiction is not to destroy the appointment, for the appointee is then just as free to pursue his remedies
in the state courts. It does not necessitate "going behind" a valid
probate court appointment, ° as was thought by the court in the Jaffe
case, but merely determining a matter over which the probate court
itself had absolutely no power, namely, federal jurisdiction. Therefore, it would appear that a federal court is not fulfilling its duty when
it does not consider whether fraud on the jurisdiction has been committed by asking if there was an intent to deprive any party of legal
rights. i.e. the right to non-removable state court litigation.
Litigants have attempted to draw a distinction in cases where
the grant of administrative letters to a foreign representative took
place in the forum state, but without success. It is the personal
citizenship of the representative which governs, and that cannot be
altered merely by accepting a fiduciary appointment in another state, 91
even where the law of the appointing state deems the appointee to
have thereby changed his citizenship.9 2
The courts have developed two exceptions to the general rule
that it is the citizenship of the executor or administrator which governs.
The first is where he is a mere nominal party acting as a conduit through
which a specified action is required to be brought. 93 Thus, where
Mississippi required all sheriffs to give a bond for faithful performance
to the Governor and all suits on the bonds to be brought through the
Governor, in a suit on the bond of a Mississippi sheriff for the use of
several New York citizens, the court, finding jurisdiction, said:
" . in no just view of the constitution or law [Judiciary
Act] can he be considered as a litigant party: both look to things
89. Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 78 F. Supp. 892 (D. Minn. 1948), aff'd on
other grounds, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949), Cerri v. Akron-People's Telephone Co.,
219 Fed. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914) (This case may have been overruled, sub silentio, by
Harrison v. Love, 81 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1936), which relies on the Mecom case, note
87 supra.)
90. See French v. Jeffries, 149 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 755
(1945).
91. Amory v. Amory, 92 U.S. 186 (1877).
92. E.g., Memphis Street Ry. v. Moore, 243 U.S. 299 (1917).
93. Maryland, for Use of Markley v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490 (1884) ; Browne v.
Strode, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). Where the executor of a deceased trustee is a
mere nominal party to perform the ministerial act of conveying title it is the citizenship of the deceased trustee which will govern. Walden v. Skinner, 101 U.S. 577
(1879).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol1/iss2/2

16

MAY

Cohan and Tate: Manufacturing Federal Diversity Jurisdiction by the Appointment o

1956]

MANUFACTURING

DIVERSITY

JURISDICTION

not names-to the actors in controversies and suits, not to the
mere forms or inactive instruments used in conducting them, in
virtue of some positive law.
" .
Executors and administrators are not in this position, they are the actors in suits brought by them; the personal
property of the decedent is vested in them; the persons to whom
they are accountable, for whose benefit they act, can bring no
suit to assert their rights against third persons . . . ; nor can
they interfere with the conducting of the suit..
"
The other exception is a very tenuous one, and has not yet been
passed on by the Supreme Court. Where, in a statutory action, the
recovery may be sought by either the administrator (or executor) or
the beneficiaries but an election must be made, then the administrator,
if he sues, has been held to be a mere nominal party with no personal
interest, analogous to a next friend.95
Thus, in normal probate administration, if there appears to be
some advantage to bring an action in the federal courts, the requisite
diversity is easily manufactured. The executor or administrator is
the real party in interest and so will be the party to whose citizenship
the court looks, and the anti-collusion. statute generally will not be
applied.
Trustee
The rule is universal that when a trustee vested with valid authority to sue is a party to an action it is his citizenship alone which
governs the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 6 The citizenship of the
grantor " or the beneficiaries is immaterial." Furthermore, the trustee
is an indispensable party to an action to recover property which is in
his possession.99
94. McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9,14-15 (1844).
95. Thames v. Mississippi for Use and Benefit of Shoemaker, 117 F.2d 949 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 630 (1941).
96. Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U.S. 451 (1892). 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDEAL PRacTICE AND PROCEDURE 15, 19-20 (Rules ed. 1950) ; 1 CYCLOPEDIA ov FEDERAL PROCEDURE
417 (2d ed. 1943) ; HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSKelley v.
TEM 917 (1953); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1365-1370 (2d ed. 1948).
Queeney, 41 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D.N.Y. 1941). In Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933),
where bonds were assigned in trust under a bondholders' protective agreement, the
Court recognized that the transferors would be the ultimate beneficiaries but stated
that "Resort to litigation was not the principal thing in mind when [the agreement
was] made, and that what was intended was to invest the trustee with full title ......
290 U.S. at 190. See also Dunn v. Waggoner, 11 Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 59 (1832), where a
state court, finding identity of citizenship between trustee and defendant, denied
federal jurisdiction.
97. Gardner v.Brown, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 36 (1874).
98. Knapp v.Railroad Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 117 (1873); Coal Co. v.Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172 (1870).
99. Massachusetts & Southern Construction Co.v.Cane Creek Township, 155 U.S.
283 (1894) ; Baker v.Dale, 123 F.Supp. 364 (W.D.Mo.1954).
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The reason for this is again based upon the real party in interest
rule. In many situations, such as in railroad trust deeds, or bondholders' trust indentures, there will be many hundreds or thousands
of beneficiaries."
It would not seem wise to require that we look
beyond the trustee's citizenship in cases where the benficiaries are
widely spread among the states and the controversy does not in fact
have a local flavor. The trustee is the proper party. Particularly,
as is often the case, the trustee's citizenship ought to govern where
the acts of the trustee himself acting in his fiduciary capacity, are
drawn in question. 1 ' The case is somewhat removed from the ordinary action involving an administrator, where the acts in dispute will
usually have been committed by or against his decedent. Where a
stranger deals with the trustee, he is aware of his citizenship at the
time of the transaction. Federal court litigation is thus forseeable.
As with the other types of representatives, the place of appointment
0 2
of the trustee, where such is done by court decree, is immaterial.1
The device of transfer to a trustee of a property interest has withstood attacks as a collusive creation of federal jurisdiction in the most
obvious of cases. Thus, where a trust, created in 1920 with an Arkansas trustee, contained provision for substitution of the trustee, he
could resign in 1926 in favor of a Missouri trustee who immediately
brought action against the Arkansas defendant; the land which composed the trust was located there-a most local controversy. Yet.
the court found there was no collusion and federal jurisdiction was
°8
valid.
Apparently no judicial inroads have been made on the steadfast
rule as applied to trustees, at least where a bona fide trust is created. 0 4
In one wide area, however, the trustee, though the proper party to
the action, is bound by statute by another's citizenship. That area
is bankruptcy, where the trustee is limited to those courts where the
bankrupt himself might have sued.' 05 This rule, however, is subject to two exceptions: (1) Any suit by the trustee to which the
100. See note 96 supra.
101. Cf. Barber v. Powell, 222 N.C. 133, 22 S.E.2d 214 (1942), petition to remand
denied, 135 F.2d 728 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 752 (1943).
102. Shirk v. City of La Fayette, 52 Fed. 857 (C.C.D. Ind. 1892).
103. Mathis v. Hemingway, 24 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1928). See also Curb & Gutter
Dist. No. 37 of Fayetteville v. Parrish, 110 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1940).
104. Under the old assignment clause and presumably under present section 1359
trusts were subject to attack for being mere colorable assignments. Thus, in Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330 (1797), jurisdiction was denied where a
naked trust was created by an obviously colorable conveyance of land.
. 105. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 23, 30 STAT. 552, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 46(b)
(1952). In corporate reorganizations under Chapter X, where section 23 is inapplicable, the trustee may bring any plenary action in the federal courts.
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defendant consents, need not be brought where the bankrupt might
have sued; (2) in like manner suits may be brought by the trustee
under sec. 60(b), 67(c) and 70(e) to recover voidable preferences
and fraudulent transfers by the bankrupt, regardless of the defendant's
consent.' 0 6
Receivers
It has generally been held that in an action by or against a receiver
for a corporation or an individual the receiver stands on his own
personal citizenship in the federal court when the sole jurisdictional
basis is diversity of citizenship.' °7
Though the Supreme Court has never had occasion so to hold, it has
taken occasion to group receivers with other representatives:
. ..representatives may stand upon their own citizenship in
the federal courts irrespectively [sic] of the citizenship of the persons whom they represent,-such as executors, administrators,
guardians, trustees, receivers etc. . . . o
As with other types of representatives, it is immaterial where
the receiver was appointed. Thus, if a receiver who is a citizen ol
State A is appointed by a court in State B for a corporation incorporated in State B, and the receiver sues or is sued by a citizen of State
10 9
B, there is diversity.
No distinction seems to have been made between suits by or
against a receiver for causes of action arising while he was operating
the business, and suits on causes of action arising before his appointment."n The most common type of action involves a railroad which
a receiver has continued to operate for the benefit of creditors. It
is clearer that diversity exists if a litigated accident occurred while the
receiver was operating the road than if it happened before the receiver
appeared."' But this distinction has not been judicially expressed,
106. 30 STAT. 562, 564, 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §§96(b), 107(c), 110(e) (1952).
107. For a collation of cases, see Annot., 148 A.L.R. 804 (1944); 1 CYCLOPEDIA
op FEDERAL PROCEDURE 472 (2d ed. 1943) ; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1313 (2d.ed.
1948).
108. New Orleans v. Gaines's Administrator, 138 U.S. 595, 606 (1891). See also
Mexican Central Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1903).
109. Farlow v. Lea, 8 Fed. Cas. 1017, No. 4649 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1877). See Davies
v. Lathrop, 12 Fed. 353, 358 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1882): "The defendant, while an officer
of the New York court and sued as such, was a citizen of New Jersey. He was a representative as much as an executor or a trustee is. In fact, he was a trustee. The personal citizenship of the executor or trustee is what is regarded."
110. Compare Barber v. Powell, 222 N.C. 133, 22 S.E.2d 214 (1942), petition to
remand denied, 135 F.2d 728 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 752 (1943), with Brisenden v. Chamberlin, 53 Fed. 307 (C.C.D.S.C. 1892).
111. Ibid.
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which seems consonant with the rule applied to other types of representatives.
The citizenship of the corporation

112

or individual

"'

whose as-

sets the receiver controls is immaterial. Likewise, the citizenship of
the creditors for whose benefit the debtor's assets are being managed
or distributed need not be considered." 4
The receiver was not treated as an assignee under the old assignee clause,' 15 and presumably would not be treated as such by the

new anti-collusion statute which succeeded the assignee clause. 6
As with other representatives, the receiver is treated as the real
party in interest and it is that test which is controlling in the determination of diversity of citizenship. Thus, in an action for negligent
death against the receiver of a railway company, the court stated:
41*
It is an error to say that the receiver is not a real
party in interest. Perhaps the plaintiff could have sued the railway company, leave to that end having been obtained..
But a judgment in that event would be posterior in lien to the
mortgages on the property. The receiver has been sued in order
to give the plaintiff a claim on the property and income in his
hands. . . . The receiver operating the railway is himself a
common carrier, and is liable as such . . . this court . . . has

appointed the receiver to hold, supervise and control it.
represents the property .

.

.

He

the jurisdiction of this court . .

depends upon the citizenship of the parties to the record."

'17

It has further been held that the receiver himself is a "necessary,"
or, more accurately, an indispensable party to an action for negligence
against the company in receivership; the receiver has taken title to the
property of the insolvent debtor, holding it in trust for the creditors
in whose behalf he was appointed, and jurisdiction may not be founded
by not joining him."'
It is clear also that the mere fact that a receiver is appointed
by a federal court does not, in and of itself, allow him to invoke
112. Barber v. Powell, 222 N.C. 133, 22 S.E.2d 214 (1942), petition to remand denied, 135 F.2d 728 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 320 U.S. 752 (1943).
113. Coal & Iron Ry. v. Reherd, 204 Fed. 859, 883 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 231
U.S. 745 (1913): "When the plaintiff was made the arm of the Virginia court as its
receiver to collect and take in hand the assets of the partnership, he was by the law
constituted the sole actor. . ....
114. Irvine v. Bankard, 181 Fed. 206 (C.C.D. Md. 1910), aff'd without opinion,

184 Fed. 986 (4th Cir. 1911).
115. Ibid. But cf. Bradford v. Jenks, 3 Fed. Cas. 1132, No. 1,769 (C.C.D. Ill.
1840).
116. 62 STAT. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952).
117. Brisenden v. Chamberlain, 53 Fed. 307, 310 (C.C.D.S.C. 1892).
118. Moore v. Los Angeles Iron & Steel Co., 89 Fed. 73 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1898).
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the jurisdiction of the federal courts as a controversy arising under
the laws of the United States." 9 One exception to this rule is made
in the case of receivers appointed for national banks, which could have,
of course, sued in a federal court by virtue of their creation by Congress. 2 '
The recent case of Chapman v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry.,"' is interesting as a possible slight divergence from the general rule. In
that case there was an action for negligent death by the decedent's
father, a citizen of Texas, against the receiver, a citizen of Missouri,
appointed by a .Missouri court for a railway incorporated in Texas.
By seemingly specious reasoning, the court said that since the railroad
was required to be operated by the receiver in accordance with state
law, the Texas venue requirement that suit may be brought in the
county of the accident would be meaningless unless the court in
such vicinity had jurisdiction over the receiver. Therefore, reasoned
the court, since this venue provision is valid in this case, the citizenship
of the receiver may be disregarded. The cases cited by the court do
not support its position or its reasoning. On the basis of precedent the
case seems clearly wrong. Its importance, however, lies in its reluctance to find federal jurisdiction. This was an action based on state
law. Funds necessary to the recovery were located in Texas according to statute and the only out-of-state connection was the citizenship of the receiver and the place of his appointment. The lower courts
may be feeling the pinch of the general rule to look no further than
the citizenship of the receiver.
Guardians
The jurisdictional status of a guardian has been frequently litigated. The Supreme Court, however, has passed but once on a
guardian's jurisdictional claim. In 1903 Chief Justice Fuller said for a
unanimous court:
"If in the State of the forum the general guardian has the
right to bring suit in his own name as such guardian, and does
so, he is to be treated as the party plaintiff so far as federal
jurisdiction is concerned, even though suit might have been instituted in the name of the ward by the guardian ad litem or next
friend." "s
119. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25 (1934). An action ancillary to the one for the receiver's appointment by a federal court may be instituted regardless of citizenship.
White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 (1895). But, of course, diversity must have existed in
the action for the appointment of the receiver if based on state law.
120. Gibson v. Peters, 150 U.S. 342 (1893).
121. 71 F. Supp. 1017 (N.D. Tex. 1947).
122. Mexican Central Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1903).
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This statement is in line with the real party in interest test applied
to other representatives, though it oversimplifies the test. The guardian need only be vested by the law of the place of his appointment
with incidents of ownership of the claim sufficient to qualify him as
the proper party to the suit. 123 It is the function of the federal court
124
to characterize his status as that of the real party in interest or not.
An action involving the disposition of a ward's property will re1 21
quire the general guardian to be an indispensable party.
Usually the guardian will have been appointed by the forum state.
But if the guardian is one appointed in another state, he has first to
be recognized for the purpose of suing by the forum state; then the
law of the appointing state is controlling to determine whether the
guardian is vested with power sufficient to be the real party in interest.126 Thus, capacity to sue is tested by the law of the forum; the
guardian's powers are determined by the law of the state of appointment; and it is the federal court which will characterize him as the
127
real party in interest or not.
The Eckman case 128 involved the general guardian of an infant.
A Texas guardian appointed by a Texas court sued a Massachusetts
corporation in a federal court in Texas to recover for injury to his
ward, an Illinois minor. In sustaining jurisdiction, the Court found
that by the law of Texas the guardian was "entitled to the possession
and management of all property belonging to, the ward" and was
entitled "to bring and defend suits by or against him. . . ." Three
Texas cases were cited to show that a guardian need not make his ward
a party to any action. In two cases the general guardian was permitted by the Texas courts to enforce in his own name rights which
ran only to his ward; in the third suit was by a next friend.i"
123. The guardian is one of those representatives enumerated in F3D. R. Civ. P.
17(a), page 206 supra, with permission to sue in the district courts as the real party in
interest.
124. The guardianship area is given special treatment in FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c)
"(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. Whenever an infant or incompetent person has
a representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like
fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent
person. If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly appointed representative he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint
a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in
an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the
infant or incompetent person." This provision does not seem to add much to Rule
17(a).
125. Hart v. Feely, 109 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), supra, note 58.
127. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1314-1315, 1365 (2d ed. 1948); 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 455-456 (3d ed. 1951) ; 2 BARRON & HOLTZOPP, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 37-39 (Rules ed. 1950).
128. Mexican Central Railway Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903).
129. Id. at 434-436.
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Prior to this case there had been dictum in the Supreme Court
stating that
"The case of such a guardian [appointed in a state in which
the guardian but not the ward was a citizen] differs from that of
an executor of, or a trustee under, a will. In the one case, the
title in the property is in the executor or the trustee; in the other
the title in the property is in the ward, and the guardian has
only the custody and management of it, with power to change
its investment..

130

At the outset the guardian ad litem, or the next friend or committee, ought to be distinguished from the general guardian or curator.
It is uniformly held that the representative who holds appointment
either by a court (the guardian ad litem) or by natural personal relationship with the ward (the next friend) for the sole purpose of
prosecuting or defending the particular action at bar is merely a nominal
party whose citizenship is to be disregarded. 1 This is so because
states have been uniform in subjecting such guardians to court control
in the management of the ward's property; so limited are the powers
with which such a guardian is vested that the federal judiciary characterizes the ward, rather than the guardian, as the real party in in3 2

terest.'

A different result has obtained with respect to general guardians.
There is great variation in state laws and there is considerable variation in federal characterization of these state-appointed representatives.'
In Stout v. Rigney 134 a Missouri curator brought suit for a foreign
insane party against a citizen of Missouri. The court, in upholding
federal jurisdiction, characterized the ward as the real party in interest. Title to the property, it found, has remained in the ward and
suits had to be brought in the name of the ward in Missouri, despite
a statute, not referred to in the opinion of the court, requiring a
guardian to prosecute all actions for his ward, to manage the estate and
settle demands on the estate.
In Wilcoxen v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.13 suit was brought against
a citizen of Illinois by an Illinois guardian, appointed in Iowa, on behalf
of an Iowa insane. The Iowa statute provided that: "The action of
130. Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452, 472 (1884).
131. E.g., Blumenthal v. Craig, 81 Fed. 320 (3d Cir. 1897) ; Horzepa v. Dauski,
40 F. Supp. 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). See also In re Moore, 209 U.S. 490 (1908).
132. E.g., Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
133. 47 A.L.R. 319 (1927).
134. 107 Fed. 545 (8th Cir. 1901).
135. 116 Fed. 444 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1902).
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a person judicially found to be of unsound mind must be brought by
his guardian." 136 But the ward was held to be the real party in
interest and jurisdiction was upheld. The Court said that even though
a guardian could sue in his own name and managed and controlled
the ward's property, title had remained in the ward and the guardian
was sufficiently under the control of the appointing court to make him
merely a nominal party.
These two cases were decided before the Supreme Court decided
the Eckman case "'? in 1903. No case held the general guardian to
be but a nominal and inconsequential party from 1905 until 1949.138
Then, in Martineau v. City of St. Paul 139 an Illinois guardian brought
suit in a Minnesota federal court for injuries to his minor ward. The
ward and the defendant were both citizens of Minnesota. A state
statute provided that a guardian might "sue without joining with him
the person for whose benefit the action is brought." 140 Stating that
the local probate court could not transmute a local controversy into
one involving citizens of different states, the court of appeals denied
jurisdiction by holding that the Minnesota decisions showed that the
action must be brought by the guardian in the name of the ward, who
was the real party in interest. Collusion was not made a basis for
decision in this case, but was in fact an alternative ground for the
holding by the district court denying jurisdiction.'
In Fallat v. Gouran '42 an action was brought by a New Jersey
guardian, the daughter of the injured Pennsylvania ward, against a
Pennsylvania defendant. The Pennsylvania statutes allowed a guardian
to prosecute actions for the incompetent; but title remained in the in136. IOWA CODE §3481 (1897).

137. Mexican Central Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903), notes 122, 128, supra.
138. During this period from 1905 to 1949 six cases held the guardian stood on
his own citizenship. The only major opinion among these decisions was in Detroit v.
Blanchfield, 13 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1926), where it was held that the Michigan statute,
identical with Rule 17(a), allowing a guardian to sue in his own name, made the outof-state guardian the real party in interest. This case apparently overruled the sixth
circuit's earlier decision in Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 137 Fed. 48 (6th Cir.
1905), decided just after the Eckman case but without reference to it. The other cases
were all clouded by collateral issues: New York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner, 265
Fed. 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 252 U.S. 591 (1920) (restoration of incompetent's
mind appears to have rendered the question moot) ; Pulver v. Leonard, 176 Fed. 586
(C.C.D. Minn. 1909) (Pleading defect; the citizenship question would now be ruled
by the subsequent eighth circuit decision in the Martineau case) ; Ansaldi v. Kennedy,
41 F.2d 858 (D. Mass. 1930) (court unclear whether plaintiff is a general guardian
or a guardian ad litem) ; Smith v. Burt, 46 F.2d 336 (W.D. La. 1930) (By Louisiana
statute, an incompetent assumes the same citizenship as his curator).

139. 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.04 (1947).
141. Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 78 F. Supp. 892 (D. Minn. 1948).
142. 220 F.2d 325 (1955).
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competent; 143 a guardian's death did not abate the action;

ment was the obligation only of the incompetent;

145

a judgand compromise
144

46
Juor settlement could take place only under court supervision.1
risdiction was denied by the district court, strictly on the theory that

the ward, not the guardian, was, under these statutes, the real party
in interest. The anti-collusion statute, raised by the defendant, was
considered not applicable; the court relied on the Jaffe case in the same
circuit. 47

The third circuit reversed, specifically declining to follow the
eighth circuit in the Martineau case. The test, said the court, is only
whether the guardian has the capacity to sue. If so, he may stand
on his own citizenship. This position is, as the court recognized, a full
return to the statement of the rule in the Eckman case. The test applied by the district court in the Fallat case, that the guardian's powers
other than that of capacity to sue were made so subject to the control
of the appointing court that only the ward could be considered the real
party in interest, was rejected.
The Fallat case states: "It is our conclusion that it is not the
citizenship of the incompetent, whether or not he be the real party in
interest, which governs but the citizenship of the guardian, provided
he has the capacity to sue." 148 By the adoption of the capacity test,
the Fallat case sets itself apart from the other similar cases in this
area. The case implies that the other courts have misinterpreted the
true basis of diversity and that when the other courts speak in terms
of real party in interest, they really mean to base the decision on capacity
to sue.' 49
The ultimate diversity determination would in most cases be the
same, whether one adopts a capacity or real party in interest criteria.
Therefore, there seems little reason to delve Pandora-like into new
juristic linguistic variations on an old theme. It suffices to say that
the various text commentaries, law review excursions, and case precedents predominately speak in terms of real party in interest with em143. PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1633 (1954).
144. Id. tit. 50, § 1842.
145. Id. tit. 12, R. 2063 (1951).
146. Id. tit. 12, R. 2064 (1951).
147. Jaffe v. Philadelphia & Western R.R., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950), note 82
supra.
148. 220 F.2d 325, 326 (3d Cir. 1955).
149. The opinion cites the Elbert case, infra note 180, as supporting the capacity
test basis and quotes the Supreme Court as follows: "This conclusion to disregard the
tortfeasor's citizenship in the instant case for purposes of federal jurisdiction is fortified by cases honoring the states' characterization of a guardian or other fiduciary as
determinative of the real party in interest in federal litigation". Although the court did
emphasize capacity, they spoke in terms of real party in interest.
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phasis on capacity as an important element in determining who is
the real party in interest; there seems little reason to stir otherwise
calm waters.
Attempt has been made to distinguish cases where the ward is
an infant from cases where the ward is an incompetent. 5 ' It will be
noticed that the statutes under which the district court decided Fallat
v. Gouran apply only to incompetents."' The authority seems strongly
to indicate that this distinction may in fact have been made; yet the
courts have never articulated it. The distinction, however, seems farfetched. True, the infant is under a disability for a definable period
of time, while the incompetent's disability is regarded as not dependent
on passage of time but on the physical and mental condition of the
ward. The incompetent is accorded public protection only until this
disability disappears. But while the disability is in existence, the
q.ialities of the guardianship are no different whether the ward is an
1 52
infant or an incompetent.
The federal courts are forced to apply a state procedural rule,
i.e. whether a guardian can sue by himself, to determine their own
jurisdiction. The state courts are not concerned with federal jurisdictional problems when they give guardians such powers. 3
Should
not the rules be made by someone who will at least consider their effect on the important aspect of federal jurisdiction?
150. See Annot., 47 A.L.R. 319 (1927). But see 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 13141315 (2d ed. 1948) ; 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 455-456 (3d ed. 1951) ; 2
BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 37-39 (Rules ed. 1950).
151. Incompetents' Estates Act of 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 1631-2041
(Supp. 1954).
152. Pugh v. Jones, 134 Iowa 746, 112 N.W. 225 (1907) ; 25 AM. JUR. § 60 (Supp.
1953).
153. In Kaufmann Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C. 401 (O.C., Phila. 1954), President Judge
Charles Klein of the Philadelphia Orphans' Court, in an extensive and carefully considered opinion, concluded from all the various facts presented to him, that it would
be in the best interests of an injured minor to appoint a New Jersey guardian in order
to create the necessary diversity for federal court jurisdiction. At page 405, he stated:
"In any event, from a careful consideration of the record in this case I am convinced
that verdicts in accident cases in the Federal courts are generally higher than those
rendered in similar cases in our State courts. . . . Whether or not, in any specific case,
the appointment of such nonresident guardian creates such diversity of citizenship as
to enable him to bring suit in the Federal courts is a matter which the Federal court,
alone, is competent to adjudicate and upon which this court can only speculate." Further in the case it is stated: "It has been suggested that it may be improper or indelicate for the parties to seek to create diversity of citizenship in order to permit suit to
be started in the Federal court. The hearing judge, after careful consideration has
reached the conclusion that there is no merit to this suggestion."
The court in the Martineau Case by way of dicta commented on this problem. "We
think that a Probate Court of Minnesota, by appointing a nonresident as a guardian
for a Minnesota minor, cannot transmute what is purely a local controversy into one
between citizens of different states, or confer jurisdiction of the controversy upon the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota." Martineau v. City of St.
Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th'Cir. 1949). In support of this dicta, see 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 312 (2d ed. 1948)'.
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Assignees
Assignment of an interest in property presents a problem somewhat different from that of subrogation 154 or fiduciary representation.1 55 Assignment creates a legal interest in the successor, as opposed to the equitable interest received by the subrogee. And it is
a legal interest created by the parties themselves and not by operation
of law as in the case of most fiduciary representatives. When an assignment is complete, the assignor retains no interest, legal or equitable,
in the property assigned.
This method of transferring property was well known at the time
the nation was founded, and there was some discussion of the diversity
clause in connection with it in the state conventions for ratification of
the Constitution. Men feared the manufacture of federal jurisdiction
by the mere sale of their property to a foreign citizen. This fear
found expression in the First Congress, which promptly passed the
famous assignee clause in the Judiciary Act of 1789.156
The present operative 1948 statute has only once been applied to
defeat an assignment.' 5 7 The emphasis now is on the collusion or
impropriety which might be involved in any transfer, without distinguishing between assignments and other transfers.
This seems to be one area where the courts have narrowly construed the grant of jurisdiction. When the assignment is genuine, the
assignor's bona fide successor in interest is his assignee, and if it is the
kind of interest which is assignable, then the other original party
must assume the risk of assignment to an assignee from a different state.
He can make the interest non-assignable if federal courts are distasteful
to him.
Nevertheless, there is a wealth of decisions to support nearly any
position on the jurisdictional effect of an assignment. The early
cases usually struck down jurisdiction where it depended on the diver154. See pp. 229-237 infra.
155. See pp. 212-226 supra.
156. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 11, 1 ST'Ar. 73, 78. See Warren, New Light on
the History of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 79-80 (1923).
157. See Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R. 1951), where jurisdiction
was denied. In Petrikin v. Chicago, R.I. & P..Ry., 15 F.R.D. 346 (W.D. Mo. 1954),
the court refused to defeat under section 1359 a damage claim which had been assigned
by an Illinois insurance company back to its Missouri insured, who then brought action
in the state court against the Illinois tortfeasor. The cause was removed, but defendait
later attacked the district court's jurisdiction. The court seems to say that because the
plaintiff sued in the state court, the assignment was not made for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction. The court evidently was satisfied that collusion did not exist,
even though this assignment was of a kind which would not have survived attack under
the old assignee clause.
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sity of an assignee,"' but not always.1" 9 Recently, litigants seem to have
found the courts more willing to find a reason for legitimizing the
assignment.'
But there is not uniformity even today.'
Nor have
the federal courts been able to find a workable rule where litigants have
attempted to defeat jurisdiction. Usually the courts will accept such
defeat.' 6 2 But we must note with interest the recent case of Lisenby v.
Patz " where each of several plaintiffs assigned one one-hundredth
of his accident claim to a co-citizen of the defendant in an effort to
insure trial by the courts of the plaintiff's home-state courts. The court
refused to remand to the state court, stating that the plaintiff-assignee
must have a "real interest, i.e. a genuine interest, as distinguished from
an interest solely by way of accomodation to the assignor-plaintiff." 164
The court further said:
. . this decision is not based upon the accepted fact that to
permit partial assignments in personal injury cases would totally
destroy the right of removal by reason of diversity of citizenship.
Congress could probably correct this evil by appropriate legislation but this is not the duty of the courts. Indeed, if the practice
of using a nominal plaintiff-assignee continues to spread, Congress may be required to act as the underlying reasons for protecting a non-resident defendant will be completely removed within a
158. Cashman v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 118 U.S. 58 (1886); Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138 (1885) ; Turnbull v. Ross, 141 Fed. 649 (4th Cir.
1905) ; Board of Commissioners v. Schradsky, 97 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1899) ; Norton v.
European & N.A. Ry., 32 Fed. 865 (C.C.D. Me. 1887). A fair inference of a collusive
arrangement, if dismissed under the collusion statute, was all that seemed necessary. Chandler v. Town of Attica, 22 Fed. 625 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1885). In Little v.
Giles, 118 U.S. 596, 603 (1886), the Court said that ".... when [the interest of the
nominal party] is simulated and collusive and created for the very purpose of giving
jurisdiction, the courts should not hesitate to apply the wholesome provisions of the
law."
159. E.g., Lanier v. Nash, 121 U.S. 404 (1887).
160. Moynihan v. Elliott, 195 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1952) (jurisdiction based on extension agreement between assignee and original maker) ; Petrikin v. Chicago, R.I., &
P.R.R., 15 F.R.D. 346 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (re-assignment of insurance company's subrogated claim). Judge Clark has said: "Since the claim is owned and may be sued upon
by someone, all a defendant may properly ask is such a party plaintiff as will render
the judgment final and res adjudicata of the right sued upon" which, in turn, is determined by Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F.2d 406, 407 (2d Cir.
1940).
161. Steinberg v. Toro, 95 F. Supp. 791 (D.P.R. 1951); Bickens v. Seaboard
Service, 96 F. Supp. 245 (D.N.J. 1950) (assignment of several claims of less than
$3000 to a single plaintiff to aggregate over $3000 for the purpose of collection only
held insufficient) ; Golden v. St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n, 10 F.2d 220 (E.D. La. 1926).
162. In the leading case of Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43, 44, 45 (1886) the
Court said, speaking of the 1875 anti-collusion statute: "And by analogy to this law,
it may perhaps, be a good defense to an action in a state court, to show that a color,_,able assignment has been made to deprive the United States court of jurisdiction; but,
as before said, it would be a defense to the action, and not a ground of removing that
cause into the Federal Court." See also, Rosecrans v. William S. Loyler, Inc., 142 F.2d
118 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Krenzien v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Kan. 1954) ; Bernblum v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1934).
163. 130 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
164. Id. at 674.
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period of a few years, due largely to the increasing popularity of
survival statutes being enacted by the legislatures of many
states." 165
The courts today seem to apply two tests to determine the jurisdiction validity of an assignment. Firstly, under state law, the assignment itself must be valid. Secondly, as we have seen above, there must
not be collusion upon the jurisdiction of the court.16 6 Does not this
require an investigation of the reasons or intent behind the transfer?
It does not invalidate the transfer to find it was collusive; it merely
disappoints an incautious transferor, who learns, as he should already
have known, that he could not transmute his interest in a local controversy into one with a federal flavor.
.Subrogees
The subrogee stands in much the same position with respect to
federal jurisdiction as the executor or administrator. The subrogee is
not a trustee in the same sense, yet this has not seemed to deprive
him of the substantial interest in the action and his personal citizenship is determinative of federal jurisdiction.
Without dissent, jurisdiction has been found where there was
identical citizenship between the subrogor and the defendant, 16 7 so that
suit might not have been brought in the federal courts had not the
element of subrogation interposed a new party. The leading case is
New Orleans v. Gaines's Administrator,6 ' where plaintiff asserted
certain rights against the city previously belonging to its grantees with
whom plaintiff had settled independently. The court, disposing also
of the assignment clause of the Judiciary Act,' 69 stated that
"Subrogation is not assignment. The most that can be said
is, that the subrogated creditor by operation of law represents
the person to whose right he is subrogated. But we have re165. Ibid. See also and compare Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. England, 22 F.
Supp. 284 (W.D. Mo. 1938), with Daldy v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp., 38 F. Supp.
454 (E.D. Mo. 1941).
166. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1324-1329, 1334 (2d ed. 1948) ; 2 BARRON &
HOLTZOPP, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE 8-11 (Rules ed. 1950); 1 CYCLOPEDIA
OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 491-492 (3d ed. 1951) ; 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
555-583 (2d ed. 1943) ; HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM

720-721, 918 (1953).

167. For a collation of cases, see 6 A.L.R.2d 137 (1949). See also 2 BARRON &
HOLTZorr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 11-15 (Rules ed. 1950) ; 1 CYCLOPEDIA
oF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 472 (2d ed. 1943) ; HART & WECHSLrR, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

917 (1953); 3

(2d ed. 1948).
168. 138 U.S. 595 (1891).
169. Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137 § 1, 18

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

STAT.

1313, 1346-1351

470.
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peatedly held that representatives may stand upon their own
citizenship in the federal courts irrespectively of the citizenship of
the persons whom they represent,-such as executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, receivers, etc. The evil which the
law was intended to obviate was the voluntary creation of federal
jurisdiction by simulated assignments. But assignments by operation of law, creating legal representatives, are not within the
mischief or reason of.the law. Persons subrogated to the rights of
others by the rules of equity are within this principle." 170
The subrogation problem most frequently arises in the insurance
field. An insured person will suffer a loss, and his insurance company will compensate him for the loss, thus becoming subrogated to
This is normally
the rights of its insured against the wrongdoer.'
72
In states which allow the
only an incident of indemnity insurance.'
the subrogee to sue by himself as the real party in interest only if he
has paid the entire amount of the loss, giving adherence to the old
rule against splitting causes of action, the insurer must do so to stand
on his own citizenship.' 73 Some states allow the subrogee to sue by
himself regardless of the proportion of the legal claim to which he has
become subrogated. 4
The rule, however, does not present a serious challenge to anbitious litigants. For where it appears that as a result of subrogation,
federal court jurisdiction will depend on whether the insurance company
has made compensation to its insured, the company can merely withhold or speed up its payments to its own advantage. In fact, it has
even been held that where the company has made the myopic blunder
of compensating its insured so that jurisdiction would have been
destroyed, it could quickly re-assign its claim against the tortfeasor
back to the insured so as to restore federal jurisdiction.' 5
170. 138 U.S. 595, 606 (1891).
171. E.g., United States v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949)
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 166 U.S. 468 (1897) ; Van Wie v. United
States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948) ; Continental Ins. v. Bahcall, 39 F. Supp.
315 (E.D. Wis. 1941). See HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUBROGATION §§ 3, 13
(1889) ; SHELDON, SUBROGATION § 3 (2d ed. 1893) ; Langmaid, Some Recent Subroga-

tion Problems in the Law of Suretyship and Insurance, 47 HARV. L. REv. 976 (1934) ;

Comment, 5 ALA. L. Rzv. 276 (1953) ; Comment, 43 CAL. L. REv. 85 (1955) ; Note, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 1076 (1955) ;Note, 38 GEo. L. J. 646 (1950).
172. See Boiserine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1940).
173. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co., 184 Fed.
426 (6th Cir. 1911). See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tel-Mor Garage Corp., 92 F.
Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). For a statement of this position in a non-diversity case
with respect to FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a) see United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,
338 U.S. 366, 380 (1949).
174. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Ohio Edison Co., 126 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1942).
175. Petrikin v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 15 F.R.D. 346 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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Direct Action Statutes
Some states, by means of so-called direct action statutes, allow
an injured person to bring action directly against the wrongdoer's
insurer alone."' Though different in some respects from the cases we
have already considered, the problem takes on very similar proportions when the requisite diversity of citizenship exists between the
complainant and the defendant insurance company, but is lacking between the complainant and the wrongdoer.
Only in Louisiana have the courts dealt with the problem. Perhaps this is because in that state alone the direct action statute has
been interpreted to extend to insurance policies written outside LouisiIn other direct action states, where the statute applies only
ana. "'
to policies written within the forum state, diversity problems do not
arise frequently, because most companies incorporated outside the direct action state will naturally require that its policies be written elsewhere than in the direct action state, so that their policy's "no-action"
clause 178 will be effective. Thus, any company caught by the direct
action statute in any state but Louisiana will, practically always, be
a corporation incorporated and doing business solely in the forum state,
and thus deemed to be a citizen of that state. There will, therefore,
be no diversity even between the complainant and the defendant insurer. But with the advent of the Watson case I" it seems likely that
more and more direct action states will extend their statutes to policies
written outside the forum state, thus introducing the same diversity
problems which the Supreme Court so recently decided in passing on
the Louisiana direct action statute in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Elbert.'
176. LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 22: 655 (West 1953); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 258,
STAT. § 85.25 (1951).
177. See the companion cases, Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48
(1954) and Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
178. Typical was the "no action" clause in the insurance contract involved in the
Elbert case: "No action shall be against the company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy, nor
until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been fully determined
either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of
the insured, the claimant and the company." It is also provided that bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured shall not relieve the insurer. See footnote 3 to the Supreme
Court's opinion.
179. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
180. 348 U.S. 48 (1954). "The burden placed on the Louisiana federal courts by
the Direct Action Statute has been very heavy. In the Eastern District the Baton Rouge
Civil Action docket is made up almost entirely of cases brought under this provision,
while the New Orleans Civil Action Docket is at least 50 to 60% made up of such
cases." Letter from A. Dallam O'Brien, Jr., Clerk, United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, to Mercer D. Tate, January 12, 1956. See also 53 MICH.
L.R. 1000 (1955), 66 HARV. L. REV. 1529 (1953), 40 VA. L. REV. 801 (1954), 29 TUL.
L. REV. 525 (1954).

§ 3815 (1923); Wis.
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The Elbert case was brought in the federal court in Louisiana by
a citizen of Louisiana injured in an automobile accident in
Louisiana, caused by the alleged negligence of another Louisiana
citizen.
The defendant, an Illinois corporation, had issued in
Louisiana a public liability policy to the husband of the alleged
wrongdoer, insuring members of his family in the operation of the
family car. Defendant had been. certified to do business in Louisiana
and had consented in writing to be sued under its direct action statute.
The district court, despite the fact that the alleged tortfeasor had not
been made a party, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
because the controversy was substantially between two parties who
The court of appeals reversed. 2
were citizens of the same state.1 '
The Supreme Court affirmed that reversal with a holding in favor
of federal diversity jurisdiction.'
Between whom was the controversy? There is first the underlying tort liability of the alleged wrongdoer. Secondly, there is the
liability of the insurer on the contract of insurance which it has issued.
The Supreme Court read this Louisiana statute as differentiating between actions against the insurer alone and actions against either the
tortfeasor alone or together with the insurer and forcing an election
of remedies upon the complainant. She is thus compelled to seek one
remedy, according to the Court's view, for two completely separate
rights or controversies. On the one hand she has a non-diversity
remedy against the wrongdoer with respect to their controversy. On
the other hand she has a remedy against the insurer directly with
She must look before she
respect to the statutory "controversy."
leaps, for the point of no return is when either remedy is sought. 4
The difficulty with this analysis is that it treats the two separate
causes of action, if in fact they are mutually exclusive, as entirely independent of each other. In fact, the cause of action against the
insurer could in no way exist were it not for the existence of the
181. 107 F. Supp. 299, rehearing denied with opinion, 108 F. Supp. 157 (W.D.
La. 1952).
182. 201 F.2d 500, rehearing denied, with dissenting opinion, 202 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1953). Cf. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1948).
6 A.L.R.2d 128 (1949) ; Lewis v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 465
(W.D. La. 1952).
183. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954).
184. There is clear language in the Louisiana cases which supports the Court's
position. Unfortunately it is all dictum, and it seems questionable that the Louisiana
court would adhere to its dicta if faced with a complainant who had sued the insurance company directly, lost on a contract defense, and comes now against the wrongdoer.
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cause of action by the complainant against the tortfeasor.'8s The one
is built on top of the other. The tort controversy must be the basic
proposition on which can be grounded the subsequent proposition
of the insurer's contract liability. It is true that certain defenses are
lost to the insurer in the direct action, l' 6 thus changing the complexion
of the controversy between it and the complainant from what it would
be if there were two separate actions. But the basic controversy of the
complainant against the tortfeasor must no less exist.
The analysis we have applied to fiduciary representatives is well
applied here also.'
Could not the federal courts interpret a time
element into the word "controversy" as used in the Constitution and
the jurisdictional statute ? By so doing the federal courts could rule that
in the direct action case the controversy attached when the primary
activity of the parties reached such a stage of completion that a cause
of action became assured and a controversy existed. The contract
of insurance was not made for the benefit of any third party; it was
made for the protection of the insured, so the complainant may not
claim as a third party beneficiary. Nor can the statute be said to
create a vested interest in the public and to make all insurance contracts conclusively issued for the benefit of the general public. If
this had been the intention of the Louisiana legislature, compulsory
liability insurance would have been the solution.' 88 Therefore, the
insurer did not enter into the picture automatically upon the happening of the accident, but only at such time as complainant learned
of the insurance policy and insurer was notified of the accident.
In the Supreme Court the insurer also raised the question whether
it was the real party in interest. In holding the insurer the real party
in interest the Court said that:
"to disregard the tortfeasor's citizenship in the instant case for
purposes of federal jurisdiction is fortified by cases honoring the
states' characterization of a guardian or other fiduciary as determinative of the real party in interest in federal litigation. New
Orleans v. Gaines's Administrator . . . ; Mexican Central R.
Co. v. Eckman. . . . There is even greater justification for dis185. The Direct Action Statute has been held to create a substantive right which
becomes vested immediately upon injury to pursue a remedy against the insurer. Fisher
v. Home Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952).
186. See West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950) (defense of
failure to receive prompt notice of accident is lost.); Edwards v. Royal Indemnity
Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) (defense that injured party is the insured's wife
is lost).
187. See pp. 212-226 supra.

188. This has been the solution adopted in Massachusetts. 3 ANN.

STAT. MASS. c.

90, §§ 34A-34J (1954).
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regarding the tortfeasor's citizenship here than for disregarding
the citizenship of a beneficiary since the insurer-unlike a fiduciary-has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation." 189
There can be little doubt that the insurer is the real party in
interest.1"' Whether that is a valid test for citizenship in diversity
actions we have already explored."'
Was the tortfeasor an indispensable party under Rule 19(a) ? The
insurance company thought so, but the Court disagreed. To have
held him so would have ousted jurisdiction, for there would not have
been complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.' 92
Viewing the statute as creating an optional right vested in the complainant to proceed against either the tortfeasor or the insurer, the
Court felt that complete disposition of the entire claim could be made
in the one action, without injustice to any of the participants.
But suppose that complainant brought such a direct action against
the insurer, who interposed the defense that the insured tortfeasor
had failed to pay his premiums for the past year, thus causing the
policy to lapse; the insurer wins without ever litgating the issue of
its insured's tort liability. Is complainant to be barred from a day in
court on the tort controversy? " The Supreme Court seems to think
it would. Suppose, either that the Supreme Court has misinterpreted
the Louisiana court on this question or that the issue arises in another
state where the complainant would be allowed a second try. If there
is recovery against the tortfeasor, he will certainly have a right of
action against his insurer on his contract. It is his first time in court
on the contract issue and certainly he will not be bound by the prior
determination to which he was not a party. If in the second litigation
of the contract issue with a new party, possibly different evidence
and a different jury, the insurer might now lose and be subject to
a liability from which it had already freed itself. Even if the insurer
189. 348 U.S. 48, 51. Is the Court correct in saying that it is the states' characterization of a fiduciary as determinative of the real party in interest? Or is it a federal characterization based on state-given powers. See pages 6-7 supra.

190. For a recent and interesting distinction between "real party in interest" and

"capacity" as applied to a guardian under Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, See Beugston v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 132 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. La. 1955).
191. See pp. 206-207 supra.
192. The complainant and one defendant would both be Louisiana citizens, thus
ousting jurisdiction under the doctrine of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806).
193. See Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 64 HARv. L. Rev. 818, 862-863

(1952).

RESTAT MENT, JUDGMENTS

§ 96(1) (1942).
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wins, it will have been subjected to defending the same matter twice.'
Is not this an injustice to one of the parties?
The classic test of indispensability in the federal courts is found
in Shields v. Barrows:
"Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy,
but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made
without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience." "'
Indispensability raises a question of federal procedure, and in this
case of federal jurisdiction, which is to be determined in accordance
with the federal, not state, characterization. 96
It would seem to be inconsistent with equity and good conscience
to allow the insurer to be twice exposed to liability on its contract
of insurance. But the controversy will be left in such a condition
when the tortfeasor is not joined, at least in a state where the complainant is free to pursue a second action against the tortfeasor when
unsuccessful because of a contract defense in the first action against
the insurer. To remedy this the only answer is to require complainant
to join the tortfeasor, thus eliminating the requisite diversity of citizen97

ship.1

The anti-collusion statute 1'8 was not raised in the Elbert case.
In view of the general reluctance in recent years to apply this statute
it is doubtful that it would have availed the insurer of anything. But
it is interesting to speculate what a court might do were it inclined
to respect the statute as one of strict limitation. The provision, it
will be recalled, does not stipulate by whom the party has to be "improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction"
of the district court. Could this possibly be interpreted to apply to a
state legislature? If it were shown that a substantial reason for passing the direct action statute was so that these actions could be brought
in the federal courts, where juries are not reversible on appeal 99
194. See 66 HARV. L. REv. 1529 (1953).
195. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129, 139 (1851).
196. Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 183 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1950); Lawrence v.
Sun Oil Co., 166 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1948). See Note, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1050, 10511052 (1952). Contra: Dunham v. Robertson, 198 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1952).
197. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).

198. 62 STAT. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1952).
199. In Louisiana, state appellate courts are not bound by determination of facts
by the jury. See Wright v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 198 F.2d 303, 305-306 (5th
Cir. 1952).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
[VOL. 1: p. 201

and damage recoveries tend to be higher,' then would this be collusion on the federal jurisdiction?
Combined with the constitutional principle that the states are
without power to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 2 01 the
anti-collusion statute might carry some convincing power. It would
require a strict reading of the statutory provision, but such a strict
reading has often been urged with respect to jurisdictional statutes.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said:
. . The dominant note in the successive enactments of Congress relating to diversity jurisdiction, is one of jealous restriction, of avoiding offense to state sensitiveness, and of relieving
the federal courts of the over-whelming burden of 'business that
intrinsically belongs to the state courts,' in order to keep them
free for their distinctive federal business . . . 'The policy of the
[diversity] statute . . . calls for its strict construction. The

power reserved to the states, under the Constitution, to provide for
the determination of controversies in their courts may be restricted
only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary
sections of the Constitution .

.

.

Due regard for the rightful

independence of state governments, which should actuate federal
courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.' "202
The Elbert case is going to make it difficult for the jurisdictional
question to be raised in any other state. Having gone this far, most
litigants will be deterred from pressing the issue further, even though
the statutes be slightly different. Lower federal courts are not likely
to be impressed with subtle distinctions. The one possible distinction most likely to succeed seems to be one based on the optional right
of action which the Supreme Court found in the Louisiana statute.
If, in Louisiana or some future direct action state, it can be shown
that there is available to the complainant something more than an optional right, that she does have a possibility of a second chance against
the other party, then she may be able to press a more forceful argument that the matter in controversy is between complainant and tortfeasor, or that the tortfeasor is an indispensable party.
In the meantime, new states may adopt the Louisiana formula.
New states are bound to have even more flooded federal courts. And
200. See Judge Rives dissenting in Elbert v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 202
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1953); Kaufmann Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C. 401, 404 (O.C., Phila.
1954).
201. Cf. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
202. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76, 77 (1941), rehearing
denied, 314 U.S. 714 (1941).
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state court determinations of intrastate controversies based on state

law will become fewer and fewer.
Corporations,UnincorporatedAssociations,
and Class Actions
Though not directly within the scope of this discussion, there are
three types of representative actions which seem worthy of mention
in passing. The first of these is the suit in the corporate name. Chief
Justice Marshall felt that a corporation was not a citizen within the
His Court held that a suit in the
meaning of the Constitution.'
corporate name was, for jurisdictional purposes, a suit by or against
all the stockholders. Later, however, the Court deemed a corporation
a citizen, though an artificial person, of the state of its incorporation,
thus reversing its original position."°
This position was later rephrased so that there arose a conclusive legal presumption that the
stockholders of a corporation were all citizens of the state of incorporation." 5 This presumption has prevailed to the present. 20 6
The second type is the suit by or against an unincorporated association, such as a partnership, board of trustees or labor union.
The fiction of personal citizenship has never been extended to such
an entity. The citizenship of all the individual members is controlling,
not just that of the officers or managers. 0 7 This is an area where
capacity is irrelevant; even if the association has, under the applicable
law, the capacity to sue or be sued as an entity, it still has no jurisdictional status as an entity. °8 Once again, the underlying philosophy
203.
204.
205.
206.

Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 329 (1854).
See McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARV. L. Rev. 853, 1090, 1225

(1943), and Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and Possessors of Liberty, 94

U. PA. L. RFv. 202 (1946).
207. E.g., Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889). Union officials suing to compel recognition of union as bargaining agent had no interest in the subject matter.
Motion to drop such parties sustained, Railway Employee's Dep't of AFL v. Virginian

Ry., 39 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1941) ; Oil Cooperative suing for injuries to member

companies not the "real party in interest," Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Service station association not a proper party
to sue for damages to its members despite a charter provision that it act for their benefit, Alabama Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp.
386 (N.D. Ala. 1939) ; Union not a proper party to enforce an individual employment
contract based on agreement with union, Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local

370 v. New York Cent. R.R., 7 F.R.D. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1946); where state gives parents equal control over minor children, both are proper parties in suit on behalf of
minor, Constance v. Gosnell, 62 F. Supp. 253 (S.C. 1945).
208. E.g., Philadelphia Local 192 of American Federation of Teachers v. American Federation of Teachers, 44 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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is that it is the individual members who are the real parties in interest.2o9
The third type is the class action. Here the courts have carved
an exception out of the rule stated in the preceding paragraph. For
reasons of expediency the courts have looked only to the citizenship
of the parties of record 210 and not to the citizenship of other members
of the class."'
It does not matter, as it does with respect to the aggregation of the amounts of claims for jurisdictional purposes, whether
the suit is, as Professor Moore divides them, a true, hybrid or spurious
class action.212 The question most frequently arises in the shareholder's derivative suit. Even though the corporation in such a suit
must be made a defendant213 and recovery will also inure to the
corporation," ' jurisdiction will not be defeated.2" ' It should be noted
that Rule 23(b) (2) requires that the stockholder's complaint allege
"that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United
States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have
jurisdiction." 216
IV
Observations and Suggestions
Diversity jurisdiction can reasonably be said to be the result of
the local prejudice against out-of-state litigants which the framers of
the Constitution had experienced or anticipated and the desire to encourage the commercial growth of the nation by allowing nationwide
business interests to litigate their controversies in a country-wide, uniform legal framework which would allow, not only for a more efficient
dispensing of justice, but also a unity of treatment and procedure
upon which they could rely.
209. Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904); Levering & Garrigues
Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. granted limited to all questions except diversity, 287 U.S. 590 (1932). See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1407-16 (2d
ed. 1948).
210. Ayers v. Wiswall, 112 U.S. 187 (1884); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d (8th Cir. 1948). See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3485-86 (2d ed. 1948).
211. Irwin v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 19 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 540, second petition denied 275 U.S. 572 (1927).
212. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3486 (2d ed. 1948).
213. Koster v. American Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
214. Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. 626 (1873) ; Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F.2d
550 (2d Cir. 1944).
215. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3530-34 (2d ed. 1948).
216. Fi. R. CIv. P. 23(b) (2). See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3530 (2d ed.
1948).
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There is now a great overcrowding of the federal courts 217 and a
large percentage of this burden is due to the abuse of diversity jurisdiction, where the federal court is merely acting as an alter ego to
the state court.2 1i

It is an aberration of the federal system to allow

these plaintiffs to come into the federal courts with cases of circumscribed state interest. As a result litigants are forced to wait unreasonable lengths of time to have their cases adjudicated, frequently
causing severe injustices. 219 The present situation is a blot on the
bar, bench and federal system.
Litigants prefer the federal courts because the rules of evidence
are more liberal, the verdicts obtained in a federal court are frequently
larger than those obtained in comparable situations in a state court,
the bench of the federal court is less susceptible to local influences and
there is less opportunity for local prejudice. The attorney for the plain217. The statistics compiled in the
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
STATES COURTS (1954)
show the great in-

crease that has occurred in the utilization of the federal judicial system:
Figures based on number of civil cases commenced.
Basis of Jurisdiction
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
Total Cases
54,622
51,600
58,428
64,001
59,461
U.S. Cases
)
22,429
19,424
22,880
23,881
19,949
) Total
Private Cases
)
32,193
32,176
35,548
40,120
39,512
Federal Question
)
6,775
6,474
7,663
8,892
7,547
Diversity
)
13,124
13,490
15,135
17,383
18,615
) Private
Admiralty
)
2,757
2,550
2,764
3,223
2,947
General Local Iurisd.)
9,537
9,662
9,986
10,532
10,403
Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending 1941-54.
No. of Judges
Civil Cases
at End of Yr.
Commenced
Terminated
Pending
1941
197
38,477
38,561
29,394
1954
251
59,461
57,903
68,431
% increase
27.4
54.5
50.2
132.8
For earlier statistics, see Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 16-17 (1948); Shafroth, Federal Judicial Statistics, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 200 (1948) ; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision
of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234-236 (1948) ; Clark, Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A.J. 499 (1933); AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, Pt. II, 47, 99100, 102, 105 (1934).
218. In New York plaintiffs often experience delays of three to four years before
having their cases adjudicated. Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented on the situation
that "the vice is the availability of diversity jurisdiction. What is true of New York
is true, in varying degrees, of every big center." Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58 (1954).
219. "The serious fact is that in1955, alt:ir,!h there were occasional gains in the
calendars of the district courts, on the whole the congestion and delay in civil cases
which has been noticeable in recent years increased. The number of districts in which
this trend was manifest was greater than in the year before. The ratio of civil cases
pending at the end of the year to the number terminated during the year, which in
1941 was 76 percent, was at the end of 1955 117 percent. This means that whereas in
1941 the district courts at their current rate of disposition could have disposed of the
civil cases pending, aside from new cases, in approximately. 9 months, at the end of
1955 they would have needed for that purpose approximately 14 months." ANNUAL
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tiff further may consider the fact that federal judges are appointed
for life and therefore more likely to be free from local political controversies. Federal judges have more liberal power to comment upon
the state of the evidence and have a greater freedom in directing the
verdict. Finally, federal rules of procedure are less confining than
those of the state courts and there is a lesser degree of technical forms
of pleadings and motions.
Costs are much greater in the federal courts for several reasons.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for a fuller presentation
of a litigant's case, thus extending the length and scope of a trial.
Usually there is a greater distance for the litigant, his attorney and
witnesses to travel to the federal court than to the state courts. If
the case is appealed the distances are even greater to travel to the
seat of the federal court of appeals. Here the advantage often goes
to the corporation, which, with limitless resources, money and time,
can make federal litigation unreasonably expensive and time-consuming.
But this privilege is a two-edged sword: it works in favor of the
corporation by increasing the costs to the individual litigant, but the
corporation is subject to greater damage verdicts in tort cases as a
result of trial in a federal court.
There is much that can be done to alleviate the abuses of federal
diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction is not a constitutionally
created right, but rather it is a congressional response to the powers
given by the Constitution to create the necessary federal court apparatus. The Constitution does not require that there be diversity
jurisdiction. It merely provides that "The judicial Power shall extend to
States. .
REPORT

.

.

. Controversies
, 220

.

.

. between Citizens of different

OF THE DIucToR OV THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 01F THE UNITED STATES

COURTS 5 (1955).

"In 1955 the district courts terminated 58,974 civil cases, which were more than
1,000 above the number terminated in the previous year, 57,903. Nevertheless the
number terminated was 401 less than the number begun, 59,375, so that the backlog
of civil cases pending went up from 68,431 to 68,832. Although the increase of 401 was
less than 1 percent, the hope for a decrease was not fulfilled.
"The median time for disposition of the normal civil cases terminated by trial in
the 86 districts having solely federal jurisdiction, increased from 13.5 months in 1954
to 14.6 months in 1955, 16.7 months for cases tried by the court without a jury, and
12.6 months for cases tried with a jury. This time has risen more than half from 1947
when it was only 9 months. The condition is one for grave concern since the time within which a litigant who has a law suit for a federal court can expect to have it disposed of, is for him very important. In 1955, 40 districts showed increases in this time
and only 20 decreases. Also while last year there were only 24 districts in which the
median time exceeded the national median of 13.5 months, this year there were 25
districts in which the median time exceeded the higher national median of 14.6 months."
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 7, 8 (1955).

220. U.S.

CONST., art. III,

sec. 2.
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It has been strongly advocated that diversity jurisdiction be abolished.22 ' A representative statement on this thesis holds:
"What is needed is a total reconsideration of the jurisdiction,
guided by the principle that federal judicial energy should be
preserved for vindication of those interests which, because the
Congress has considered them of national importance, have become the subject of the federal substantive law. Within that
sphere and that alone, federal courts can function as creative agents,
the authorized interpreters of Constitution, treaty, and statute, the
acknowledged sources of that subordinate and interstitial legislation which must come in any system from the courts.
"In many ways the worst part of diversity jurisdiction is that
it debases the judicial. process, reducing federal judges to what
Judge Frank has called 'ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of
some particular state'-because they lack the requisite authority
to speak themselves. Erie v. Tompkins was a necessary corrective
of an act of usurpation but the federal system will be at its
best when federal courts concern themselves primarily with federal
law and there is smallest room within the range of their adjudication for the Erie doctrine to apply." 2
Twice bills have been reported favorably out of committee in the
Senate to abolish diversity jurisdiction."z The committee headed by
Senator Norris stated:
"No sound reason can be given why Federal district courts
should have jurisdiction based solely upon a diversity of citizenship.
In fact, under existing law, .

.

. Federal courts do not have

jurisdiction on account of diversity of citizenship unless the
amount involved is $3,000., or more. There is no reason, if the
Federal court should have jurisdiction in such cases, where $3,000.
is involved, why it should not have a similar jurisdiction if the
case involved only $2,500.; and if the Federal court should be
deprived of jurisdiction where the amount in dispute is $2,900.,
there is no logical reason why such jurisdiction should be given
if the amount is increased to $3,000." 224
221. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CON'rZMP. PROB. 216, 235 (1948) ; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 522 (1928); 18 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 254 (1950). Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3. See Senator Norris's report, S. REP. No. 691, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Burford v. Sun
Oil Co. 319 U.S. 315 (1942).

222. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert 348 U.S. 48, 58 (1954).

Mr. Justice

Frankfurter further stated at pages 53-54 "But our holding results in such a glaring
perversion of the purpose to which the original grant of diversity jurisdiction was directed that it ought not to go without comment, as further proof of the mounting
mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of
diversity jurisdiction."

223. S.REP. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) ; S.REP. No. 530, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932).

224. S.REP. No. 691, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
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The defenders of diversity jurisdiction hold that there was an
historic basis for it and that the reasons supporting its establishment
'are equally apropos today." 5
It has been stated:
"To my way of thinking there has been a great deal of loose,
unreliable talk about the undesirability of diversity jurisdiction.
Certain people have made the matter a party line. .

.

. From

my study of diversity cases I would say that not only has diversity
jurisdiction by and large been good, it has served as a stimulus,
and a needed one, to state law development.

.

. . There may

be some limitations we should place on diversity jurisdiction but
if we are to develop as a nation, it would. seem to me that far
from destroying diversity jurisdiction we should broaden and ex"226
tend it. National businesses need it..
There now exists a basic homogeneity in our legal fabric. National business interests little fear sporadic outbreaks of state court
legal lapses detrimental to their interests. Prejudice may well exist
in certain local situations and when it appears its effect can be nullified. State appellate procedure now seems capable of coping with
this problem and where the state machinery fails there exists federal
review on the basis of due process.22 7
The diversity jurisdiction in many ways seems antithetical to
many tenets of our democratic society. It is a jurisdiction which
seems to give greater importance to property rights than to human
rights. If a Pennsylvanian negligently runs a car over a New Jersey
citizen in New Jersey he may be extradited if apprehended elsewhere
and brought to New Jersey to be tried for manslaughter by the courts
of New Jersey. Yet the same Pennsylvanian is assured of a trial
in the federal courts if he so desires it in a wrongful death action
brought by the survivors and representatives in New Jersey. So too,
the federal courts are open to an out-of-state debtor but not an out-ofstate criminal. This is indeed an anomaly.
In 1952 the House Judiciary Committee favorably reported bills
to raise the jurisdictional amount to $10,000.,228 but the plan failed.
225. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It,18 A.B.A.J.

433 (1932). See note 226 infra.

226. Keeffe, Twenty-Nine Distinct Damnations of the Federal Practice-and a
National Ministry of Justice, 7 VAND. L. REV. 636, 655-656 (1954). See also Morse,
Judicial Self Denial and Judicial Activism-the Personality of the Original Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts, 3 CL-v.-MAR. L. R-v. 101, 142-145 (1954) ; Newlin, Proposed Limitations Upon Our Federal Courts, 15 A.B.A.J. 401, 403 (1929).
227. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. XIV.

228. H.ReP. No. 1506, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). See also H.R. No. 6435, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Note also that a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 7203, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., on July 7, 1955, to raise the jurisdictional
amount of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, but the bill was pigeonholed.
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The solution of raising the requisite dollar value for federal court
jurisdiction seems a controversial one. The initial grant in 1789 was
restricted to cases in which the matter in dispute involved a substantial monetary amount in order to prevent defendants from going long
distances to defend small claims.229 But this evil seems well controlled
by the $3,000. restriction. An increase in the jurisdictional amount
only arbitrarily decreases the number of cases handled without a
sound consideration of the substantive elements of the problem. If
a reason for diversity jurisdiction is based on the fact that a federal
forum is necessary to adjudicate controversies which cross state boundaries this problem is not solved by raising the jurisdictional amount.
Furthermore, such a solution will tend to inspire allegations of greater
damage. If there is a sound current heed for diversity jurisdiction it
seems unfair to raise arbitrarily the requisite dollar amount. If there
is no present need for diversity jurisdiction the problem should be
faced forthrightly and not dealt with in this manner to placate those
hostile to the principle.
It has been suggested that corporations be deemed citizens of
the states where they are doing business for the purposes of federal
diversity jurisdiction." 0 The adoption of this recommendation would
eliminate a large number of diversity cases, since corporations would
no longer be considered solely citizens of their place of incorporation."'
229.
(1953).

HART

& WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL :COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 39

230. Attorney General William D. Mitchell's Bill, S. 937, 72d Cond., 1st Sess.
(1931), and H.R. 10594, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). The bill was recommended to
Congress by President Hoover; see Sen. Doe. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
The Bill stated "..., That where a corporation organized under the laws of one or
more States or under the laws of one or more foreign countries, carries on business in
a State other than the one wherein it has been organized, it shall for purposes of jurisdiction in a district court of the United States be treated as a citizen of such State
wherein it carries on business as respects all suits brought within that State between
itself and residents thereof and arising out of the business carried on in such State."
For a full discussion of this airea see, McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARV.
L. REv. 853, 1090, 1225, at 1231-52 (1943). For a list of source material dealing with
the issues of the period see, HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 894, n 1. (1953). Congress has recognized the'abuse of corporations
doing business in several states trying to evade state courts. In 1934 and 1937 Congress
enacted legislation forbidding the district courts from having jurisdiction by virtue
of diversity of citizenship in taxation, rate-makng, and certain other types of cases
where it can be shown that the state courts are prepared to act. See 48 STAT. 775; 50
STAT. 738. The foregoing is not only important as an indication of the congressional
awareness of corporate abuse of diversity jurisdiction, but is equally important to
illustrate the power of Congress to act in this area and as an historical precedent of
congressional action to correct diversity jurisdiction abuses. See Lavin v. Lavin 182
F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1950), re: Judge Learned Hand's comments on this problem, supporting the theory that corporations be made citizens of the state where they are doing
business; Note, 39 CALIP. L. REv. 138 (1951).
231. "The corporate anomaly is, of course, judicially created and may yet yield to
an attack in the Supreme Court. Statistical analysis suggests that correction of this
ancient and "malignant" error would reduce by 70 per cent the recent volume of diversity cases in the federal courts." Wechsler, Federal JurisdictionAnd The Revision Of
The Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 237 (1948).
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This idea has merit and should be considered and presented to Congress.
Certain factions feel that the overcrowding in the federal courts
could be corrected by the appointment of more judges and the expansion of the present court facilities. 2 This may help, but the
suggestion does not face up to the symptoms creating the problem.
These suggestions would not increase the prestige nor the ability of
the federal courts to broaden their operation. Rather, it would only
water-down the federal courts' effectiveness by expanding too quickly,
before trying other approaches to the overcrowding." 3 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter believes that the appointment of new federal judges would
actually weaken the federal judiciary. He stated, "A powerful judiciary
implies a relatively small number of judges." 24
A strong argument can be marshalled for the position that the
federal courts should not accept diversity jurisdiction based on appointive representatives, such as guardians, where the federal court
feels that the appointment was made for the main purpose of creating
federal diversity jurisdiction.
Allowing diversity jurisdiction in cases where an out-of-state
representative is appointed to create federal jurisdiction is a perversion
of the diversity concept. Neither social prejudice nor any other reason
presented as an historic basis of diversity is present in this situation.
Rather, adroit lawyers are trying to get full measure for their clients.
These lawyers are to be congratulated for their persistence in their
client's cause. State court appointments made with a view toward
creating diversity are to be accepted for it is in the best interest of the
litigant to have his case tried in a federal court and this is the state
court's primary consideration. But, the foregoing situations do not
warrant federal court consideration and should be removed from the
-federal dockets. They are not within the purview of the reasons for
the establishment of diversity jurisdiction and only serve to clutter the
federal courts with purely state controversies.
The issue of abolishing diversity jurisdiction per se and the question of denying access to federal courts to representatives appointed to
create diversity jurisdiction, are separate and distinct issues. One can
reasonably assume a posture favorable to the historic view of diversity
232. H.R. REaP. No. 1506, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 1 (1952).
233. The House Committee on the Judiciary recognized that the appointment of
additional judges had helped to relieve some of the overcrowding but stated that the
continued addition of judges was no solution to the basic problem. See H.R. REP. No.

1506, 82d Cong., 2 Sess. 1 (1952). See also Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNSLL L.Q. 499 (1928).
234. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 515 (1928).
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jurisdiction. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to find sound jurisprudential reasons supporting jurisdiction where it is created by the
appointment of an out-of-state representative solely to take advantage
of the more liberal atmosphere of the federal courts. This will not do.
There is no panacea for the correction of the foregoing problem. It
could be remedied by a congressional statute leaving broad discretion
in the district court to accept or reject cases of the abusive type.
Congress could also rewrite the collusion statute in such a manner as to preclude improper appointments. Section 1359 of the Judicial
Code, since its passage in 1948, has proved ineffective to cope with
the ingenuity of the bar. The statute's purpose would be much better
served if it were to read:
The District Court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment, appointment or otherwise,
has been made a party for the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction
of such court.
This language would take care of the case where the attorney arranges to have an out-of-state secretary in his office appointed guardian,
executrix or administratrix in order to gain entry into the federal
court.
The omission of the words "improperly or collusively" which appear in the suggested statute would allow more flexibility to the courts
in dismissing such cases. Collusion is a strong term which the courts
are frequently loathe to apply, and it more often connotes an understanding between the opposing sides to a litigation, rather than an
arrangement by the persons interested in only one side of a case.
The proposed language would allow dismissal wherever the court felt
that an appointment was made in violation of such a rule; the court
need not attack the appointment itself but only its effect on federal
jurisdiction; and the court need only find that one of the reasons,
not the sole or major reason, for the assignment or appointment was
to invoke federal jurisdiction.
Until Congress takes some action along the suggested lines, however, no valid reason can be shown why the courts themselves should
not take a more stringent attitude toward the schemes of litigants designed for entry into the federal courts. Though section 1359 of the
Judicial Code may not be worded to avoid ambiguity, it does offer
a solution. Many courts have stumbled over the consideration of
motive. This has been unnecessary, as has been pointed out above,
since the court's investigation of motive in the case of appointment
of a representative is no more than a search into the purpose of the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956
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parties and a determination of whether the appointment may be successful in creating jurisdiction. In no way does such investigation
attack collaterally the appointment itself, but only one effect of the
choice.
It is indeed surprising that courts have refused to take a strict
look at jurisdictional qualifications. It is undisputed that the federal
courts are courts of limited and enumerated jurisdiction," 5 thus requiring a presumption against the existence of jurisdiction which may
be rebutted only by clear evidence that there has been a congressional
grant which will include the case at bar. 236 Many courts seem to have
forgotten this basic principle.
The federal courts could expand and adopt the concept of forum
non conveniens, 237 as they have in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 8 when
solely local controversies arise in the federal courts due to the appointment of a foreign representative. It is not convenient for the
federal courts to decide local issues of a circumscribed state controversy where diversity is based upon a fiction. This is wise especially
in view of the overcrowded situation of the federal courts.
The federal courts have dismissed an action pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens where its jurisdiction was based on
the diversity of the parties and the action was one of circumscribed
local state interest." 9 In the Gulf Oil case the court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter based on diversity of the parties. The case was
dismissed by the District Court for the Southern District of New York
235. E.g., Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371
See
(1940) ; McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
Wheaton, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Interpreted, 25 CORNPLL L.Q. 28, 58
(1939) ; Note, 46 HARV. L. Rnv. 521, 522 (1933) ; Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 388 (1930)
Comment, 37 YALE L.Q. 983, 985-986 (1928).
236. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226 (1923); Seligman's Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. La. 1939).
237. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) : "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought." For a general discussion of forum non
conveniens see: Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1929) ; Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of
Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. REv. 41 (1930) ; Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867 (1935) ; see Note, Power to Decline the Exercise
of FederalJurisdiction,37 MINN. L. Rgv. 46 (1952).
238. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). See cases cited therein.
239. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) ; Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287 (1942) ; Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1934); Canada Malting
Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932) ; Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929) ; Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co.,
262 U.S. 312 (1923) ; Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. No. 1,
191 U.S. 373 (1903) ; Simons v. Simons, 187 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Melvin v.
Melvin, 129 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Curley v. Curley, 120 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 614 (1941) ; Smith v. Sperling, 117 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.
Cal. 1953) and cases cited therein. See also, Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co.,
330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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due to the fact that the plaintiff had the choice of federal and state
forums in Virginia, the situs of the accident. The Supreme Court sustained the District Court and considered the public interest in the
suit to prevent the accumulation of litigation in congested federal
court centers, the unnecessary burdening of the community where the
district court sat with jury duty on people who had no relation to the
litigation, and the local state interests which would prefer localized
issues to be decided in the interested state courts. Further, the Supreme
Court stated that there was no compelling need to complicate the law
suit with difficult problems of the conflicts of laws. The foregoing
variation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be applied
by the district court in situations where diversity of jurisdiction has
been abused.24 ° The approach is novel, but warranted.
The Supreme Court may have an opportunity to correct the abusive representative situation since the 3rd Circuit Fallat case 241 and
8th Circuit Martineau case 242 are basically at variance.

The Martineau case bases diversity upon the real party in interest.
The Fallat case states capacity to sue is the true test. When called
upon to delineate the law the court could hold that capacity to sue
is not the basis for diversity, but rather the real party in interest is
the one upon whom diversity must be predicated. The Supreme Court
in the past has based diversity jurisdiction of a representative on
the real party in interest test; considering capacity an element in the
determination.24 This holding would tend to limit diversity to those
more intimately interested in the controversy and limit the out-ofstate representative, appointed to create diversity, to the citizenship of
the real party in interest for jurisdictional purposes. Historically, capacity to sue has been one of the factors indicating who the real party
in interest is. Nonetheless, it is suggested that this factor be relegated
to use in determining whether the appointive representative is closely
enough associated with the suit to preclude any suspicion that he was
appointed to create federal diversity jurisdiction.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bear upon this problem.
These rules do not affect diversity jurisdiction, which is a congressionally given right by virtue of the Constitution. The rules must
240. Commenting on this, see Comment, 37 YALE L.J. 983, 985-986 (1928) stating:
"The frequent practice of bringing suit in New York, solely for the purpose of obtaining a larger recovery than is usually allowed in the states where the plaintiff resides,
is persuasive of the propriety of refusing jurisdiction in such a case."
241. Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955).
242. Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1949).
243. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 51 (1954) ; Mexican Central Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903) ; New Orleans v. Gaines's Administrator,
138 U.S. 595 (1891). See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§311, 330 (2d ed. 1948).
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be limited to the procedural aspects of the suit. 44 It is not our purpose to get entangled in the Gordian knot of delineating procedure or
substance.245 It will suffice to say that it is a reasonable and preferred
manner to read Rule 17(a) as relating to the captioning of an action
in the federal court, rather than a factor in determining federal jurisdiction.246 Any substantive connotations of Rule 17 (b) must fall in the
face of the dire need to limit federal diversity jurisdiction to its original
purpose. Consequently, if an out-of-state representative is appointed
to create diversity jurisdiction, his appointment fails to do so, even
though he has the capacity to sue under the state law where the
district court is sitting. If the out-of-state guardian comes before
the district court raising a federal question, his capacity is determined
by Rule 17(b), but Rule 17(b) has no effect unless federal jurisdiction
attaches. It is the thesis of this Article that it should not attach in
those aforementioned cases which abuse federal diversity nor should
any federal procedural rules aid the aberration. So too, Rule 17(c)
should apply once federal jurisdiction attaches and should not aid in
creating diversity. It must be emphasized that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure become effective after federal jurisdiction attaches;
there is no room for a bootstrap argument.
Conclusion
The general concept of federal diversity jurisdiction must be differentiated from the specific aberation of the out-of-state representative
appointed to create diversity.
There is little reason, historically, rationally or jurisprudentially,
to permit federal jurisdiction in those cases where an out-of-state rep244. See Mississippi Power Company v. Archibald, 189 Miss. 332, 196 So. 760
(1940), where the court held an administrator was only a nominal party and consequently his citizenship was not material in determining federal diversity jurisdiction.
The court made no reference to Rule 17. See also Bengtson v. Travelers Indemnity
Company, 132 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. La. 1955).
The opponents of the above reasoning state that the decisions decided under the
old Conformity Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 728) require that the federal courts, in actions at
law, follow as nearly as possible the rules of procedure in the states in which the District Court is sitting. With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which discontinued the distinction between legal and equitable actions and set up uniform rules of procedure for all of the federal courts, the Conformity Act was in reality repealed and the reasoning of the various decisions based upon it cancelled. See 45,
W. VA. L.Q. 5 (1942). Contra, it must be realized that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not enlarge federal diversity jurisdiction since the action is a state action and the governing law is state law, see 2 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 482, 488 (Rules ed. 1950) ; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.02,
.03, .04, .09 (2d ed. 1948); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) ; Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze, 202 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1953).
245. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326, U.S. 99 (1945).
246. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) ; Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947) ; Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953).
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resentative has been appointed to create diversity jurisdiction. This
tangential deviation should be uprooted and destroyed.
The larger question of the conceptual metamorphosis of federal
diversity jurisdiction per se is neither black nor white. The concept
must stand or fall on its own merits, and not be eroded piecemeal due
to an overcrowded federal court system. There seems little to recommend the upholding of diversity jurisdiction. Whatever valid basis
for its formation that existed at its inception has feebled and faded;
its historical notoriety carries little present propriety.
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